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The politics of rentier states in the Gulf
More than two generations have passed since oil transformed the economies and societies of the Gulf 
monarchies. Gulf citizens enjoy opportunities unimaginable without oil wealth and have the security 
of a comprehensive welfare state. But how sustainable are the Gulf economies? Citizen populations 
continue to grow, oil reserves continue to fall, technological advances could lessen world demand for 
the Gulf ’s oil, and price fluctuations make planning difficult. Most Gulf monarchies have made little 
progress in transitioning away from oil despite these widely-recognized incipient problems. Periods 
of lower oil prices are met with deficit spending until prices rise again, rather than serious economic 
restructuring. They have built economies with deep structural imbalances that make it more rather 
than less difficult to reduce their reliance on oil – and political orders which are deeply constituted by 
those imbalances and threatened by reform. 
The political economies shaped by oil wealth have been primarily studied in the political science 
literature through the concept of the rentier state, which suggests that the dominance of oil wealth has 
distinctive, largely unavoidable political, social, and economic effects. Rentier state theory developed 
to explain the difficulty of diversifying economies, the bloating and inefficiencies of state institutions, 
the absence of democracy, the power of national security states, and patriarchal political cultures. 
Among scholars whose work focuses on the Gulf, though, the theory of the rentier state appears more 
often as a foil than as a bedrock theoretical perspective. Does rentier state theory actually explain 
political outcomes and structures in the Gulf? 
The contributions and limitations of rentier state theory in the Gulf were the focus of a workshop 
convened by the Project on Middle East Political Science at the Elliott School of International Affairs 
in September 2018. The discussions among a diverse, interdisciplinary set of scholars revolved around 
the nature and extent of the coming challenges to Gulf economies, and the inadequacy of existing 
theories of the rentier state to account for the political implications.  The papers presented in this 
collection range widely across countries, economic sectors, and political manifestations.  They sought 
to bring anthropological and ethnographic perspectives into dialogue with economists and political 
scientists. Two themes dominated the discussions. 
First, the extremely unbalanced labor markets in Gulf countries pose a profound challenge to any 
effort at economic reform. The vast majority of the private sector labor force across the Gulf is 
composed of foreign labor, and in four of the six GCC countries foreign residents outnumber citizens 
in the population as a whole.  Any effort at economic diversification will have to confront these 
extreme imbalances, and doing so will require confronting the political institutions and political 
culture which have evolved over decades around them, in addition to business interests with a deep 
stake in the status quo. 
Second, the “theory” of the rentier state itself needs significant rethinking to be useful in the 
contemporary context.  The field has moved beyond simple assertions of causal effects and is now 
better placed to probe specific causal mechanisms and to marshal new kinds of evidence to evaluate 
the predicted effects of rentierism on state institutions, the structure of national economies, and 
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concepts of the social contract to examine precisely how citizens engage with the state under the 
conditions shaped by oil.  What expectations do Gulf citizens actually have of their governments – 
and how do those governments attempt to shape citizens?  
Labor markets and economic reform
Discussion of the economic effects of the rentier state typically focuses on the crowding out of other 
industries, the domination of the public sector over the private sector, and the significance of the 
resources to finance extensive welfare and security states. But as important as those dimensions 
is the underlying structure of labor markets, the distinctive problems of employment which those 
economies have created, and the political expectations about the state which they have generated.  
The Gulf monarchies have no hinterlands from which to recruit citizen labor, so the labor attracted 
to their booming economies comes from other countries. The logic of rentierism, however, makes 
it difficult to widely grant citizenship to these migrants. Claire Beaugrand quotes Kuwait’s foreign 
minister protesting that “our citizenship is expensive!” And it is. Each new citizen means that the 
country’s fixed sum of oil export revenues will be divided amongst that many more people. As a 
consequence of this logic, the Gulf states have not widely granted citizenship to foreign workers. But 
that has not in any way lessened their thirst for labor. 
The ability of the regimes to offer jobs, paid for by oil revenues, to many or most of their citizens has 
created an expectation among citizens that they will receive a job in the state (though the expectation 
is most pronounced in the richest rentiers, Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait). The private sector, for 
its part, strongly prefers to hire inexpensive labor from abroad. The result is that all six Gulf GCC 
states feature a sharply divided labor market in which citizens prefer to work for the state and the 
private sector prefers to hire foreigners. This all costs a lot of money: it is expensive to provide state 
employment to so many citizens, and it is expensive to pay for the infrastructure to support the 
millions of foreign workers in the private sector.
The reliance on foreign labor creates challenges for economic diversification, which is critical to the 
success of the Gulf monarchies in preparing for a post-oil future. These challenges are seen most 
acutely in Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman has been pushing an ambitious 
agenda of social and economic change ostensibly aimed at transitioning the country to a post-oil 
future.  
Ishac Diwan sketches out two possible scenarios for Saudi Arabia. One he calls Egyptianization, in 
which low wage foreign workers continue to dominate the labor market, while “dwindling oil revenues 
continue to be shared among nationals, cheap labor continues to be freely imported, and Saudi 
reservation wages only fall slowly over time.” The long-run implications of this are dire: over time, “the 
kingdom will turn into an increasingly impoverished welfare state….” The alternative, Diwan argues, 
is to replace foreign labor with citizen labor. How would this help? He says that this would not likely 
generate globally tradable exports, but it would mean that Saudis themselves provide the labor for the 
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rest of the economy, which ultimately is less expensive than hiring foreigners. He and Michael Herb 
point out that the current strategy is instead to develop a “mega-Emirati” economy in which foreign 
labor continues to dominate the economy, including the production of tradeables. Saudi Arabia is too 
large for this strategy to succeed.
Steffen Hertog looks at the same set of issues from a different point of view: he asks what sort of 
transformation would be necessary for Saudi Arabia to restructure its economy to resemble that of an 
OECD economy. The private sector will need to create a vast number of jobs for citizens, a number 
that implies a rate of job growth that has few precedents elsewhere in the world. Tax collections 
would need to go up. Crystal Ennis similarly observes that while Saudi modernizers view women as 
an untapped resource – and indeed they are – the participation of more women in the labor force 
will require the generation of even more jobs for citizens. Hertog, ultimately, is not optimistic that 
Saudi Arabia can make the transition. He sees pauperization as a real possibility – this is Diwan’s 
Egyptianization by a different name. 
Andrew Leber, on a slightly more optimistic note, observes that one benefit of Muhammad bin 
Salman’s willingness to confront established Saudi elites is that he is willing to use state authority 
to force the private sector to provide jobs for Saudi citizens in a way that had not been found under 
previous Saudi rulers. This suggests at least the possibility that the Saudi regime is willing to break 
through some of the logjams that make labor market reform so intractable in the Gulf. Those efforts 
both depend upon and encourage repression and abuses by state security forces, which could be 
popular if directed against widely resented elites but if extended too broadly could drive resentment 
and public opposition faster than the economic reforms can demonstrate success. 
While all six GCC states have unbalanced labor markets, the severity of the problem and the urgency 
of addressing it vary across the Gulf states. The richer states – Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE – will 
not go broke if they maintain the status quo for the short term and, if oil prices cooperate, even 
the medium term. Oman has a much more immediate problem. And the GCC states are not likely 
to adopt the same strategies in addressing their labor market problems. Even today the UAE and 
Kuwait are responding quite differently, with much discussion in Kuwait about limiting the number 
of foreigners, while the UAE continues to build an entrepôt economy that requires abundant foreign 
labor. These choices will shape the political economies of the Gulf monarchies in the years ahead, with 
the potential to create strikingly different political, economic and social structures across the GCC.
Rentier state theory and the social contract
One of the original intuitions of the rentier state theory – beyond the slogan “no representation 
without taxation” – is the idea that there is a social contract in the region between rulers and ruled. 
The basic terms of the contract are that rulers would provide citizens with oil revenues and citizens 
would provide allegiance, or political quiescence, to their rulers. It did not entirely escape the authors 
of the earlier contributions to the rentier state literature that the trade of political quiescence for oil 
wealth might not last forever. Yet in much of the literature, and in the large-n works that followed, 
these qualifications are muted. 
6Recent work by scholars of the region on the rentier state view this social contract is a social 
construction, one that must be created and renewed over time. There is good historical evidence for 
the ability of rulers to deploy oil revenue to quell dissent, as Christopher Davidson points out in his 
analysis of the decline of the Arab nationalist opposition in Dubai in the 1960s.  But the contributors 
offered multiple suggestions for productive ways that we can think of the rentier social contract as 
a construct that changes over time. Moritz calls for a reappraisal of how oil affects attitudes toward 
the state: “the link between rents, rent distributions, and societal quiescence is not nearly so settled.” 
Krane argues that the success of subsidy reform suggests that the rentier “social contracts are less 
rigid than portrayed in the rentier literature.” Such questions cannot be resolved in the abstract, 
instead requiring rigorous research – whether qualitative interviews (such as those by Moritz, in 
this collection) or survey research (such as Gengler in this collection) -  on the views of citizens 
themselves about the state and society.  
Perhaps one of the more productive avenues for future research is research that takes an empirical 
approach to citizen attitudes toward oil wealth. Moritz has extensively interviewed Gulf citizens, 
asking them about their views on oil revenues and political activism. Karen Young suggests that we 
can see in the different strategies followed by sovereign wealth funds an indication of how regimes see 
the responsibility for managing “shared wealth.” And Justin Gengler offers some very specific insight 
into how citizens view the responsibilities of their rulers: when given a hypothetical choice of various 
combinations (baskets) of spending choices by the government, they rated most highly those that 
provided classic welfare benefits to citizens, especially health care and education. Spending on those 
outside Qatar was a much lower priority. 
Some questioned the existence of the social contract altogether. David Waldner and Ben Smith ask 
just who is making a contract with whom, and how would such a contract be enforced. The notion 
of a contract is, from the beginning, a metaphor, a description of how citizens view the state. Those 
views can change over time, and the mere existence of oil revenue does not freeze them into place. As 
times change, so does the framing of the social contract and the relationship of citizens to the rentier 
state. As Claire Beaugrand points out, Kuwaitis have come to feel that they are shareholders in the 
state: they benefit from its provision of goods (tied tightly to their citizenship) and their “expectations 
turn into injunctions” as they view the spending choices of the regime. 
Finally, several participants, including Makio Yamada, explore the problem of how to restructure 
the expectations of citizens. Calvert Jones views the problem from the point of view of the rulers, 
who themselves seem to view the rentier social contract as a construction, and based on this try to 
influence how citizens view the state. She uses the term social engineering to describe this sort of 
regime initiative, and points out that it “flies in the face of rentier state theory.” And she says that 
the “rentier social contract” engenders loyalty “of a rickety sort.” She closes by pointing out that 
Kuwait, which is more democratic, does less social engineering than the others. Finally, Crystal Ennis 
points to the role of women in engaging with these political economic changes, as the state carefully 
encourages their entrepreneurship. 
7As regimes and citizens work out new understandings of the relationship between citizens and the 
state we should expect to see a good deal of variation among the Gulf monarchies. Rentierism does 
not produce the same results everywhere, and we see today quite different relationships between the 
state and citizens – compare, for example, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. These differences may well 
widen in the future as choices the regimes make today, and have already made, constrain their options 
going forward.
Conclusion
One critical point made by Khalid Abu-Ismail is that this is not simply a Gulf matter.  The region’s 
poorer economies are tied to the economies of the Gulf oil-exporters, and they have a major stake 
in labor market reforms in the Gulf monarchies. While it might be in the interests of citizens of the 
oil-exporters to reduce their reliance on foreign labor, even at the potential cost of a shrinking of 
their economies, this would make that much more serious the economic challenges faced by labor 
exporting countries in the region and beyond. 
The Gulf states face hard choices about how to transition away from their current reliance on oil 
and foreign labor. There are no certainties about how these choices will be framed by the regimes 
or understood by citizens. The old rentier social “contract”, if it ever really existed, is clearly under 
strain, and citizens increasingly feel a sense of entitlement to oil revenues. The regimes will attempt to 
frame the way that citizens understand the upcoming changes, in some cases via very explicit social 
engineering. Citizens may or may not frame the changes to their countries’ political economies in 
the same way as the regimes, however, and their perceptions of what they are owed, and what they 
owe to their countries, will shape the development of Gulf political economies as they attempt these 
transitions. 
Michael Herb, Georgia State University 
Marc Lynch, George Washington University and Director of POMEPS 
January 2019
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Michael Herb, Georgia State University
Introduction
The Gulf monarchies must eventually diversify their 
economies: they must sell something to the world other 
than oil (Cherif and Hasanov 2016; Staff of the IMF 2016; 
Callen et al. 2014). For some Gulf economies – Oman, 
for example – the need to diversify is pressing. Others, 
such as Kuwait, can sustain their citizen populations on 
oil revenues for a while longer, but still need to consider 
how to structure their economies in preparation for the 
day when oil export revenues will not sustain the current 
standard of living. 
It is not easy to diversify any economy dependent on the 
export of a single primary resource. In the Gulf, such 
diversification is made even more difficult by the structure 
of the labor markets. Each of the Gulf monarchies has two 
labor markets, one for citizens and the other for foreigners. 
In the richer rentiers these two labor markets are almost 
entirely separate. Citizens mostly work in the public 
sector and foreigners in the private sector. In the public 
sector, citizen employment is a method of distributing 
oil revenues. Thus the relatively high wages paid to most 
Gulf citizens — especially in the richer rentiers — have 
little relationship to labor productivity and have little 
relationship to market wages for foreign labor. Private 
sector employers typically hire citizens only when obliged 
to by government policy and even then often do not make 
much effort to put citizen labor to productive use. 
Labor costs in the private sector are therefore low due 
to the presence of millions of foreign workers whose 
reservation wage rates are set by their home economies. 
This shapes the nature of the potentially competitive 
sectors available to investors in the Gulf economies. 
Successful economic diversification in the Gulf today has 
taken place primarily in the UAE, where diversification 
is highly reliant on foreign labor. No Gulf monarchy has 
1  This draws on a Policy Brief prepared for the Economic Research Forum (Herb 2017).
successfully diversified any substantial part of its economy 
by employing citizen labor. The central question of Gulf 
diversification, then, is whether it will be citizens or 
foreigners who provide the labor in the diversified sectors 
of the economy.
Diversification with whose labor?
There are roughly four options for labor in diversification 
in the Gulf. Each carries potential risks as well as benefits, 
and each touches on core elements of political economy 
and ruling structures.  These options are the result of 
two choices. First, how heavily do the Gulf states want to 
rely on foreign labor in their economies? Second, to what 
degree do they want to create a separate labor market for 
citizens with a higher wage rate, less onerous working 
conditions, and so forth? 
Foreign labor
More Less
La
bo
r m
ar
ke
t 
seg
m
en
ta
tio
n More Embrace foreign labor 
Limit role of 
foreign labor
Less Merge labor markets
Rely on citizen 
labor only 
1. Embrace foreign labor 
One approach, found most prominently in Dubai, is to 
fully embrace the use of low-cost foreign labor to build 
a diversified economy. This favors economic sectors like 
tourism that require large amounts of low-cost labor. 
This economy is then taxed, producing revenue that can 
be distributed to citizens via public sector jobs (though 
citizens today primarily rely on the state’s oil income). 
The Dubai strategy requires plentiful foreign labor: in the 
UAE today the ratio of non-citizens to citizens is in the 
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neighborhood of eight to one. 
While there is some high-wage foreign labor in Dubai, the 
bulk of the diversified economy is low-wage, especially 
in the hospitality and logistics industries. This makes it 
hard to transition to a high-wage economy that relies 
on expensive citizen labor. The more likely result is that 
Dubai continues to tax the diversified economy and uses 
the proceeds to fund government services and to pay the 
salaries of the citizens who provide those services. In the 
long term the strategy has an immense political cost: it 
makes citizens a small but very privileged minority in 
their own country, living on the tax revenues generated by 
millions of resident non-citizens. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with the model, 
however, is that it is not easily achievable outside the 
richest and smallest of the Gulf rentiers. The model works 
best in countries with a high per capita oil income (as is the 
case in the UAE as a whole) and a relatively small number 
of citizens. Saudi Arabia has too many citizens, as does 
Oman. Kuwait has not created a business environment 
attractive enough to seriously imitate Dubai. But despite 
the impracticality of the Dubai model, a survey of Gulf 
labor markets until very recently would suggest that is 
exactly the model all six Gulf monarchies wish to follow. 
2. Merge the labor markets
A second strategy is to embrace a low-cost labor strategy 
but combine the citizen and non-citizen labor markets 
into one without reducing the role of foreign labor in 
the economy. Diversification could then proceed with 
low-cost citizen and foreign labor. International financial 
institutions favor this strategy. It would be carried out 
by reducing the number of citizens employed in the 
public sector and cutting the wages of those who remain 
(International Monetary Fund 2015, 19). 
If cheap foreign labor remains abundant, this strategy 
impoverishes less-skilled citizens. Some citizens would 
adapt to the decline in their circumstances and join the 
labor market alongside foreign labor from poor countries, 
but many would remain at home, unemployed, reflecting 
on how they are not receiving their fair share of their 
country’s oil wealth. None of this is politically palatable. 
Education is not the solution, except at the margins: 
there needs to be a place in the labor market for less well 
educated Gulf citizens. 
Budget pressures, in the end, may require some of the 
Gulf monarchies to limit employment by citizens in the 
state sector and to cut salaries. But overall this strategy, 
executed in a determined way, is likely to be a very last 
option. In countries that still enjoy substantial oil wealth, 
reducing the standard of living of unskilled citizen workers 
to that of laborers from some of the world’s poorest 
countries is simply not a politically sustainable option. 
3. Rely on citizen labor only
A third strategy is to radically reduce the amount of non-
citizen labor in the Gulf countries. This would close the 
door to a low-cost labor diversification strategy and force 
the Gulf economies to diversify, if and when they do, with 
citizen labor. 
The Gulf monarchies are very unlikely to embrace this 
strategy completely (though some public discourse in 
Kuwait suggests some support for the strategy there). 
Nonetheless it is worthwhile, as a thought experiment, to 
consider the consequences of radically less foreign labor in 
the Gulf as a way of illustrating the complex interactions 
between labor markets, diversification, budgets, and 
political constraints. Economic activity would decline 
sharply, with the most serious impacts falling on owners 
of real estate and businesses that employ mostly foreign 
labor. Wage rates would rise sharply and the cost of locally 
produced services would also rise. Because the state 
does not tax the economy much the decline in economic 
activity would not harm state revenues, and a decline in 
the number of residents would reduce state expenses on 
infrastructure, health care, policing, energy subsidies, 
and the like. Put differently, the fixed amount of available 
hydrocarbon resources would last longer. Funds that would 
have been sent abroad as remittances would stay in the 
local economy. Countries that rely on remittances from 
the oil-rich Gulf states would lose these remittances, and 
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overall would be the most seriously harmed from a result 
of more restrictive labor policies in the Gulf monarchies.
Finally, businesses that seek to produce tradeable goods 
would face higher labor costs but would also have available 
a citizen labor force accustomed to working in the private 
sector. In the long run, the goal would be to develop a 
citizen labor force that works productively in the private 
sector producing non-tradeable goods for other citizens. 
Citizen labor that is productive in the private sector might 
also develop the skills necessary to produce non-energy 
exports as well. 
4. Limit the role of foreign labor
The fourth strategy is the one most likely to be pursued by 
the Gulf regimes (apart from the UAE and maybe Qatar). 
Instead of relying only on citizen labor, the regimes segment 
the private sector labor market, reserving some areas (usually 
sectors, or professions) for high-cost citizen labor, and other 
sectors for low-cost foreign labor. This achieves some of the 
positive aspects of the third strategy while avoiding the most 
intense negative effects. Less foreign labor raises the cost 
of labor overall, lowering state expenses. Citizens, however, 
retain some of the cost advantages of having non-tradeable 
services provided by low-cost foreign labor. 
The strategy requires a very strong administrative 
apparatus that rigidly maintains the boundaries between 
sectors reserved for citizens and those open to expatriates. 
In the absence of strong institutions, politically connected 
businesses will circumvent the rules and hire foreign labor 
wherever and whenever possible. The Gulf states, however, 
have a poor record of imposing labor market regulations 
on powerful private interests. 
Recent changes?
The key measure of the success of these choices of strategy 
is the ratio of citizens to foreigners in the labor force, and 
in particular in the private sector. Until very recently, 
all the evidence pointed toward movement toward, if 
anything, the Dubai model: the number of expatriates in 
the workforce in Gulf countries rose across the board. This 
was true of the UAE and Qatar, but also of less-wealthy 
Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Figure 1 gives a sense 
of the changes between 2009 and 2015 in Saudi Arabia: 
employment grew for expatriates in the private sector and 
citizens in the public sector. This was despite the many and 
widespread government announcements of labor market 
reforms that would lead to increased citizen participation 
in the private sector.
In the past year or so, however, we have seen some signs of 
actual change in labor market figures reported by some of 
the Gulf rentiers. The Saudi government released figures 
for the first quarter of 2018 that showed a decrease in the 
number of foreigners in the labor market of 700,000 over 
the previous five quarters, to 10.2 million (Bloomberg 
2018). This was in part a result of the imposition of a $26 
monthly fee on the dependents of expatriates, along with 
the announcement of the reservation of most retail jobs 
for Saudi citizens. Yet it is also the case that these sorts 
of labor market regulations have been announced in 
various Gulf states in the past and have been accompanied 
by ever greater reliance of the private sector on ever 
greater amounts of foreign labor. The crucial measure of 
the effectiveness of these regulations is their impact on 
demography. An actual decline in the number of foreign 
workers is significant, especially as comes during a period 
of a recovery in the price of oil.
Figure 1: Saudi employment by sector and citizenship, 2009 
and 2015. Circle sizes are proportional to the number of 
workers. Source: Jadwa Investments, February 2016, Labor 
Market Update, p7
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In Oman, where the non-citizen percent of the population 
rose from 29 percent to 45 percent from 2007 to 2017, 
the number of non-citizens in the country dropped by 
two percent from May 2017 to March 2018 (The Times 
of Oman 2018). This is not enough of a drop to suggest 
a permanent change, though there are indications that 
it is more than just a statistical blip. Across much of the 
Gulf the real estate market has declined recently, and the 
industry blames this on the departure of foreign labor. 
In Kuwait one industry source cited a fall in residential 
rents of 13 percent in a report for 2017 (Gulf News 2018). 
In Oman the departure of skilled labor has been blamed 
for a real estate crisis that has left numerous building 
owners facing bankruptcy, according to a of Bank of 
Oman official (al-Shaibany 2018). That said, the real 
estate market is also weak in Dubai, where the population 
increased over the past year from 2.9 million residents to 
3.13 million, so fewer non-citizens is not the explanation 
there (Government of Dubai. Dubai Statistics Center 
n.d.). Nonetheless the fact that the real estate industry 
blames price declines on labor force policies does illustrate 
who has something to lose in the Gulf governments, 
successfully limiting the number of foreign residents.
Conclusion
It may be that, after decades of talking about demographic 
reform, the Gulf states have actually become serious about 
it. The consequences of this for expatriates and their 
home countries are not good: remittances will fall, and 
job opportunities will be more limited. In the worst cases, 
undocumented immigrant families have been broken apart 
in immigration raids. The most severe consequences are 
visited on those with the fewest resources. 
The implications for the future diversification of the 
Gulf economies, however, are more positive. In the long 
term the only permanent solution to lower oil prices is 
the production of non-hydrocarbon tradable goods and 
services in the Gulf economies. This can be done with 
citizen labor, or without. The Gulf economies need to 
either adopt the Dubai model, with its political risks, 
or find ways to put citizen labor to work in productive 
ways in both the non-tradable and tradable sectors. 
Recent changes suggest, for the first time, that some Gulf 
states may choose to rely on citizen labor in the further 
development of their economies.
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Exploring why institutional upgrading is not so easy in rentier states
Makio Yamada, Princeton University
Can rentier states reform themselves? The governance 
capabilities of rentier states in the Gulf increasingly loom 
as a concern as their reform initiatives gradually shift from 
centrally setting general directions of wanted changes to 
implementing specific policies and programs. While the 
policy-implementation stage of reforms is influenced by 
the institutional quality of state apparatuses, the literature 
implies that such governance capabilities are systematically 
lacking in rentier states. The institutionalist scholarship has 
long viewed developing states outside the West and East 
Asia—not only rentier ones—as suffering from clientelistic 
institutions that are responsible for economic stagnation.1 
Even Malaysia, one of the major post-Asian Tigers 
emerging economies, is seen as struggling to move out 
of the middle income trap due to institutional problems 
such as corruption.2 In these states, institutions tend to 
remain inefficient and under-meritocratic as inherited and 
reproduced patronage networks keep inviting rent-seeking 
behaviors and prohibiting necessary prioritization of 
productive players.3 
These states still can leverage productive enclaves – 
sometimes referred to as “islands of efficiency,” which are 
shielded from the rest of national institutions by the strong 
political mandate (as shown by Steffen’s Hertog’s analysis 
of efficient state-owned enterprises in Gulf economies, 
for instance)4 – and achieve growth “on spot”. Such 
enclaves are often created in an “additive” manner, without 
dismantling the existing institutions—a logic similar to 
1   Daron Acemoglu, Francisco A. Gallego, and James A. Robinson, “Institutions, Human Capital, and Development,” The Annual Review of Economics, 
Vol. 6, 2014, pp. 875-912.
2   Herizal Hazri and Nina Merchant-Vega, “Malaysia’s Middle Income Trap,” The Asia Foundation, 26 January 2011.
3   Peter B. Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1989, pp. 561-587.
4   Steffen Hertog, “Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in Rentier State,” World Politics, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2010, pp. 
261-301.
5   Mary Ann O’Donnell, Winnie Wong, and Jonathan Bach, ed., Learning from Shenzhen: China’s Post-Mao Experiment from Special Zone to Model City 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
6   Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses,” p. 584.
7   Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?,” pp. 347-348.
the creation of Special Economic Zones in China, which 
are largely populated by migrants from other parts of the 
country that have been more successful in developing 
governance capabilities than other older industrial cities 
that continue to suffer from inherited and reproduced 
clientelistic forces.5 Nevertheless, for economies to grow 
sustainably and inclusively, a wider institutional upgrading 
is required.  
Then when do governance capabilities develop? Although 
this is a frequently asked question, the dynamics of 
institutional upgrading has remained a puzzle since 
Peter B. Evans said in the late 1980s that solving it will 
demand “intellectual imagination.”6 The observation of 
the emergence of governance capabilities itself is not 
new: it is, indeed, a classical agenda in social science, 
most prominently advanced by Max Weber’s theory of 
bureaucracy in the early days of the discipline. However, 
as Francis Fukuyama points out, social scientists since 
then have studied this topic much less than the process 
of policy-making.7 Recently, scholars, nevertheless, have 
gradually been disentangling this complex puzzle through 
closely examining the historical experience of states in the 
West and East Asia as well as those in other regions.
Subscribing to the discourse of contemporary liberalism, 
many scholars associate participation with governance 
via accountability. However, in recent years, more 
comparativists and historians have paid attention to the 
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record of institutional upgrading in the pre-participation 
era. They have been increasingly forming an understanding 
that the initial transformation of authoritarian states from 
those captured by clientelism to those hosting meritocratic 
bureaucracy results in economic growth creating a 
broader, productive middle class, which is more self-reliant 
and, thus, possesses greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
state than the previous patronized generations; and here 
begins the participation–governance linkage.8 
This trend, often found in the scholarly agenda of “state 
formation,”9 has been directly and indirectly met by the 
long-standing puzzle that early modern growth took 
place in a time of political authoritarianism in a range 
of countries, from England and Prussia to Japan and 
South Korea, and by an increasing view that, without due 
governance capabilities, participatory political systems 
would be fragile and distortive, rather than stable and 
developmental.10 
The dynamics of (the beginning of) institutional 
upgrading
When do the reduction of rent-seeking behaviors and 
the unraveling of the existing clientelistic order occur? 
Pierre Bourdieu once described the emergence of formal 
institutions in historical patrimonial dynastic states as a 
gradual process, in which homines novi—disinterested 
technocrats—constructed the chain of authorities that 
increasingly form a “public order.”11 Nevertheless, the 
anatomy of how these “new humans” armed with modern 
knowledge grasped political power against the long-
standing clientelistic forces was left unanswered by him.
8   Rolf Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State-Formation in Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization,” Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 615-616.
9   Tuong Vu, “Studying the State through State Formation,” World Politics, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2010, pp. 148-175.
10   Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2013, p. 
351; Jonathan R. Stromseth, Edmund J. Malesky, and Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, China’s Governance Puzzle: Enabling Transparency and Participation in a 
Single-Party State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 4.
11   Pierre Bourdieu, “From the King’s House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Genesis of the Bureaucratic Field,” Constellations, No. 11, Vol. 1, 
2004, p. 33.
12   Rick K. Wilson, “The Contribution of Behavioral Economics to Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 14, 2011, p. 213
Here the question may not be so much about the 
emergence of a political coalition of reformists itself, but 
rather about why some coalitions succeed in installing 
effective bureaucracy while others have failed in doing so, 
for the coalition’s reform attempts are normally exposed 
to obstruction by veto players with vested interests 
from major political constituencies of the regime. In the 
eyes of rulers, depriving these vested interest players of 
their long-granted entitlements will risk the stability of 
their regime and/or their political and physical life; this 
“perceived reform-stability trade-off,” thus, in many cases, 
keeps them cautious toward changes that will drastically 
alter the existing clientelistic order—even when preserving 
the status quo will only gradually undermine the regime’s 
longevity. In other words, it is structurally difficult for 
rulers to be free from the belief that they must keep 
serving as generous providers of largesse, especially as 
the distribution of rents is precisely what has created and 
cemented the foundation of their political power.
These vested interest players also appear to be myopic: 
if they stop seeking rent and their obstruction of reform 
attempts, and instead cooperate in developing the state’s 
capacity, they will eventually attain greater gains from a 
larger economic pie. Then why do they remain against 
their own long-term interest? Here, rather than rationalist 
assumptions, insights from behavioral economics, which 
incorporates humans’ cognitive biases and the resultant 
systematic deviation from rational choice models, seem to 
better explain the behavior of these vested interest players. 
Their behavior is constrained by “bounded rationality” 
and subject to a range of human tendencies, such as the 
“endowment effect” (overvaluation of the item already 
in one’s hands)12 and the “ambiguity effect” (aversion to 
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risks when the probability of the alternative choice is 
unknown).13 
The above, indeed, speaks to the sheer difficulty of 
developing governance capabilities in states where the 
reformist coalition is balanced by the groups of rent-
seeking political clients. This, however, in turn suggests 
that when a change in these vested interest players’ 
cognitive patterns happens, a space can be created for 
the reformist coalition in its advancement of governance 
agendas in a more autonomous and influential manner. 
How possible are such situations? Such situations look 
abnormal, but recent studies by historians, in fact, indicate 
that these abnormal situations did occur and served as 
critical junctures for institutional upgrading in Western 
Europe and in East Asia.
Institutional upgrading in England and Japan: 
Implications for Gulf rentier states
For instance, Patrick O’Brien’s analysis of the restoration 
of the Stuart Dynasty following the turmoil of the English 
Civil War and the short-lived autocratic Cromwellian 
republic (1642–60) examines the behavioral change of 
the dynasty’s political clients.14 These political clients, 
largely landed nobles, collectively relinquished their 
lucrative rent-seeking opportunities—tax farming—and 
agreed on initiating centralized taxation. This change was 
driven by their consensus on building a stable patron state 
even at the expense of their private interest, as, having 
experienced the crisis of their political lives in the period 
of Interregnum, they saw a loss of their privilege as a lesser 
evil than the lack of protection. They had learned that 
their continuous enjoyment of the entitlements under the 
previous clientelistic order had precipitated the decline of 
the dynasty. (Indeed, this awareness was a zeitgeist that 
13   Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, 4th Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 281
14   Patrick O’Brien, “The Nature and Historical Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and Its Possible Significance for the Precocious 
Commercialization and Industrialization of the British Economy from Cromwell to Nelson,” Economic History Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 408-446.
15   William J. Ashworth, “Quality and the Roots of Manufacturing ‘Expertise’ in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” Osiris, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2010, pp. 231-254.
16   O’Brien, p. 436.
17   Mariko Yamagata, “Yūhan no Hansei Kaikaku to Senbai-sei,” Rekishi Hyōron, No. 717, 2010, p. 66.
Thomas Hobbes referred to as a “social contract” in his 
Leviathan (1651)—a recognized need for a strong state 
capable of providing security and collective goods that 
ensure the survival of individuals’ political and economic 
lives.) Hence, the nature of Parliament began shifting from 
the house of rent seekers to the house of pain sharers. 
This institutional upgrading paved the way for the stable 
dynastic state supported by capitalism-accommodating 
nobles, with the rise of a taxation administration (Board 
of Excise) operating as a competitive economic regulatory 
body.15 O’Brien suggests the applicability of the same logic 
to major Continental European monarchical states in the 
period after the turmoil of the French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic Wars, where institutional upgrading led 
to their modern industrial growth in the mid-nineteenth 
century.16
In the late nineteenth century, Japan, headed by the 
emperor, also began its early industrial take-off. The 
origins of Japan’s governance capabilities date back to the 
institutional upgrading in two local samurai states, Choshu 
and Satsuma, which played leading roles in toppling the old 
Shogunate and formed the core of the restored imperial 
state. In these local states, reformist lower-rank samurais 
led administrative reforms in mid-century: through 
their cooperation with capable merchants and farmers, 
they built mercantilist local states and promoted proto-
industrialization. According to Mariko Yamagata, what 
was common to these two local states was their experience 
of fiscal breakdown.17 Insolvency placed samurais in these 
local states at an imminent risk of losing their political 
lives, and even the status of samurai in the case the reign 
of their lord granted by the Shogunate would be repealed. 
Thus, upper-rank samurais, who had previously gripped 
the control of the state’s fiscal and economy policy, had no 
choice but to grant space to the new meritocratic coalition. 
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In contrast, in more fiscally-stable local states, lower-rank 
samurais’ reform attempts were effectively nipped in the 
bud by upper-rank samurais and their crony-capitalists.18 
In both these English and Japanese cases (both economies 
were commodity-exporting peripheries before their 
institutional upgrading), the behavioral change of the 
vested interest players occurred due to their strong feeling 
of the vulnerability of their patron dynastic state, and a 
predicted or experienced loss of their protection. Thus, 
they took a collective action of pain-sharing aimed at 
empowering the state to ensure their long-term survival. 
It was the moment in which private and public interests 
strongly overlapped in their eyes. As indicated by 
Prospect Theory of behavioral economics, they, finding 
themselves in the domain of losses, became risk-taking 
for this collective action, while they otherwise remained 
risk-averse when they saw themselves in the domain 
of gains.19 This “cognitive change and collective action” 
approach may well complement existing hypotheses in the 
state formation literature such as war and elite politics.20 
In particular, it may identify more specific dynamics of 
elite politics concerning vested interest players and find 
commonalities between war and non-war shocks resulting 
in the similar outcome of institutional upgrading. 
If this hypothesis of a patronage-to-governance transition 
applies universally, it should be able to explain, at least 
partly, the barriers facing Gulf rentier states in their 
institutional upgrading. In these states, due to their 
still-high distributive capacity, the vulnerability of the 
patron dynasty is not much felt by vested interest players 
(although, if low oil prices continue, the long-term fiscal 
sustainability of states with lower income per capita such 
as Saudi Arabia and Oman will be uncertain). Moreover, 
the majority of citizens in these states enjoy high income 
levels owing to broad public sector employment. Such 
18   Ibid., p. 75.
19   Rose McDermott, James H. Fowler, and Oleg Smirnov, “On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, 
No. 2, 2008, pp. 335-350.
20   Vu, “Studying the State through State Formation,” p. 152.
21   Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
22   P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–2015 (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 73-115.
wide and robust patronage networks host equally wide 
and robust veto forces, making pain-sharing considerably 
difficult. With the majority of political clients remaining 
risk-averse and sensitive to the reduction of their 
entitlements, the reform–stability trade-off perceived by 
rulers appears tangible, as hinted by the reinstallation 
of the public-sector benefits and the introduction of 
compensatory distributions along with fiscal adjustment 
programs in Saudi Arabia. Here, the two representative 
classical rentier ideas—distributional state (allocation 
state) and the dominance of patronage over meritocracy 
(rentier mentality)21—appear to remain relevant, albeit 
in a neoclassical way, involving the erecting of barriers to 
institutional upgrading. 
Further research agendas
This essay clarifies two further research agendas. The first 
is the dynamics of the continuation of the institutional 
upgrading: even if reform were to be kicked off, whether 
its process continues until new, efficient, meritocratic 
institutions are consolidated is another issue. If pain-
sharing political clients lose their patience, a behavioral 
reversal may happen, leading to their attempts to recover 
the lost rent-seeking opportunities. Such attempts would 
result in a counter-reform, renewed political struggles, and 
a continuous re-composition of patronage networks, rather 
than the development of governance capabilities. To keep 
such political clients away from resistance to the reform, 
some alternative gains need to be offered to them. 
In seventeenth-century England, the economic growth 
resulting from the institutional upgrading discussed above 
benefited nobles who were landowners and agricultural 
producers; they also gradually coalesced into the circles 
of new economic elites in the financial and service sectors 
in London.22 A comparable case is colonial Korea, where 
17
RENTIERISM: INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMICS
political clients of the Yi Dynasty, the yangban, were 
coercively pensioned off by the colonial regime, which 
attempted to reproduce Japanese institutions there. The 
colonial rule benefited these former administrative elites 
who were also landowners and agricultural producers 
through the introduction of modern technology and 
the export of their agricultural products to Japan.23 The 
success of South Korea’s post-independence developmental 
coalition led by Park Chung-hee needs to be understood 
within this context: the absence of old nobles from the 
state apparatuses. For Gulf rentier states, it is, however, 
not easy to think of possibilities of a similar “pain–gain 
circuit” for their broad political clients. In these states, 
reform without sufficient alternative gains may easily 
lead to wide discontent—although their still-abundant 
financial capital may potentially be wisely deployed for less 
counterproductive re-cooptation. 
The second research agenda is a search for the second-
best option in case general institutional upgrading is 
unlikely to occur sometime soon. One possibility is 
a strategic empowerment of productive enclaves. A 
gradual aggregation of these enclaves has been a hope 
of reformists, but there may be room for doing more. 
One such way is to help develop organic relationships 
among these enclaves by facilitating their communication 
and creating productive patterns of interactions such as 
cooperation, competition, and a division of labor, whereas 
many of them currently operate solo or without sufficient 
external cooperation due to the segmented nature of the 
rentier state. Another possible approach is to support 
institutional spill-overs from these efficient enclaves to 
other state apparatuses through various means, including 
model-making and the movement of human capital; they 
may also contribute to the country’s education effort with 
the aim of expanding the future reformist population. 
23   Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
2004, pp. 42-45.
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Subsidy reform and tax increases in the rentier Middle East
Jim Krane, Rice University’s Baker Institute
Several recent developments challenge the conventional 
academic theories that model the governance parameters 
of the oil exporters of the Middle East. At least nine 
Middle Eastern governments have partially retracted 
energy subsidies which provided citizens with cheap fuel, 
electricity, and desalinated water.1 What is more, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have 
imposed a five percent value-added tax (VAT) on goods 
and services, including energy and food. Other countries, 
including the three remaining Gulf monarchies as well as 
Egypt, Algeria, and Iran, have levied VATs or announced 
plans to do so. 
For autocratic regimes which fund their national budgets 
with oil and gas export rents, the imposition of taxes and 
retraction of subsidies runs counter to social contract 
stipulations enshrined in the rentier literature. Why? 
The growing burden of domestic demand for oil and gas 
has begun to threaten the core rentier structure. High rates 
of energy demand growth are eventually incompatible 
with steady exports. Energy subsidies, a core element of 
rentier social policy, risk undermining the rentier economic 
structure, the rent lifeline that funds the state.2 Tax increases 
and subsidy reforms address the energy intensity (high 
per-capita demand) incubated by subsidies, as well as aim to 
reduce domestic consumption and preserve exports.
The politics of energy subsidy reform turn the theoretical 
convention about linkages between rent and Middle 
Eastern autocracy on its head. Rentier theory’s claim about 
1   Covered in Jim Krane, “Political Enablers of Energy Subsidy Reform in Middle Eastern Oil Exporters,” Nature Energy, April 2018, https://doi.
org/10.1038/s41560-018-0113-4.
2   This theme is addressed in greater detail in Jim Krane, “Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy in the Gulf Monarchies,” The Energy Journal 36, 
no. 4 (2015): 1–21, http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/01956574.36.4.jkra; Jim Krane, “Guzzling in the Gulf: The Monarchies Face a Threat From Within,” Foreign 
Affairs, December 19, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142692/jim-krane/guzzling-in-the-gulf.
3   Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in The Rentier State, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New 
York: Croon Helm, 1987), 65–68.
4   Useful works on oil’s historical role in state formation include: Nathan J Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the 
Making of US-Saudi Relations, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: 
Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (London: Verso, 2007); Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (Brooklyn: Verso, 
2013); Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).
oil’s influence on politics also works in reverse. Oil rents 
probably do increase the durability of autocratic regimes, 
but autocratic governance (at least in Middle Eastern oil 
exporters) also appears to increase demand for oil. That 
is because regimes stay in power not just by distributing 
oil rents, but also by distributing oil itself, a practice that 
stimulates demand. The Middle East’s oil-exporting states 
tend to be both autocratic and oil-intensive, a notion that has 
largely been ignored in the literature. (See Fig. 3 and Table 1) 
Rentier theory has largely been disengaged with the use of 
energy within rentier states, including the intensity of that use. 
Luciani, one of the few early rentier theorists to engage with 
domestic consumption, wrote in 1987 that oil “has value only 
to the extent that it is exported.”3 Minimizing oil’s domestic 
role was probably justified in the 1980s and 1990s, the classic 
period of rentier scholarship, when the Gulf states remained 
underdeveloped and lightly populated. Circumstances have 
changed. Energy products such as electricity and refined 
fuels have been distributed for decades at low, fixed prices 
which have encouraged demand for the domestic oil and gas 
used to produce them. In-kind energy distribution has, over 
time, greatly influenced residents’ consumption behaviors 
and preferences, as well as the physical shape of the built 
environment. The rentier economies of the Gulf exhibit per 
capita oil consumption that ranks among the highest in the 
world. (Table 1) That condition is a direct outgrowth of the 
pervasive and structural role of oil and gas in the formation 
of many of these states4 and their governance bargains, which 
has imposed deep influences on their institutional design and 
outcomes.
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A useful way to envision these effects is as a second stage 
in the resource curse. Oil rents first helped cement tribal 
autocratic systems to survive modernization, and those 
systems, in turn, launched policies that made their states 
extremely energy-hungry. Oil bolstered autocrats and 
autocrats bolstered oil. The Middle East has maintained 
nearly six percent yearly growth in consumption over 
the four decades since 1973, a much faster rate of growth 
than the two percent world average. Over time, Middle 
Eastern oil export economies which faced few pressures 
to rationalize demand or reduce intensity of use became 
less competitive on an energy basis relative to importing 
economies. Availability of cheap oil created distinct 
physical, institutional, and sociological outcomes in the 
Middle East, incentivizing wasteful behavior and an 
energy-intense building and capital stock. 
These new taxes and subsidy reforms would not seem 
remarkable in a participatory governance setting where 
economic and social policymaking sometimes requires 
corrective retrenchment. But in the rentier Middle 
East, they run contrary to four decades of scholarship.5 
Academics have long held that the oil kingdoms of the 
Middle East are subject to a strict set of governance 
conditions. Rulers cultivate support from their citizens 
by providing them with welfare benefits and subsidies, 
funded through export rents. These rents were sufficient 
5   For an in-depth review of rentier literature’s prohibitions on subsidy reform, see pp. 67-77 in Jim Krane, “Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy 
in the Gulf Monarchies” (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5943.
6   Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, “Introduction,” in The Rentier State, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croon Helm, 1987), 
1–21; Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); F. Gregory 
Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). F Gregory Gause 
III, “The Political Economy of National Security in the GCC States,” in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium, ed. Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 61–84; Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1999); Gwenn Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States,” Comparative Politics 31, 
no. 3 (April 1999): 295–315.
7   Beblawi and Luciani, “Introduction”; Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States; Gause III, “The Political 
Economy of National Security in the GCC States”; Oliver Schlumberger, “Rents, Reform, and Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in Dead Ends of 
Transition, ed. Michael Dauderstadt and Arne Schildberg (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2006), 100–113; Rolf Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State-
Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 4 (2008): 
599–621; F. Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” Special Report No. 63 New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011.
8   Not for lack of trying. Saudi Arabia raised but quickly reversed an increase in electricity prices in 1985. The kingdom reduced gasoline and 
electricity prices in 1992 (and lowered gasoline prices further in 2006); Bahrain in 1992 imposed substantial cuts in prices of electricity and water. 
Author interview with Abdullah M. al-Shehri, governor of Electricity & Co-Generation Regulatory Authority of Saudi Arabia, Dhahran, Oct. 21, 
2012. See also: Saudi Press Agency “Al-Naimi Hails King’s Order To Slash Prices of Petrol and Diesel” (May 1, 2006): http://www.spa.gov.sa/English/
details.php?id=357585; also: Fred H Lawson, “Economic Liberalization and the Reconfiguration of Authoritarianism in the Arab Gulf States,” Orient 
(Hamburg) 46, no. 1 (2005): 19–44.Also: Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010); Lawson, “Economic 
Liberalization and the Reconfiguration of Authoritarianism in the Arab Gulf States.”
9   See case studies of the Iran and Dubai subsidy reforms in Jim Krane, Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf, Center on Global 
Energy Policy Series (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), pp. 98-116.
to eliminate taxes and other forms of extraction, thus 
allowing regimes to avoid accountability links with 
taxpayers. Energy subsidies have been described by 
scholars as “rights of citizenship,” provided by regimes 
in exchange for public acquiescence to autocratic rule.6 
Were the state to break its side of the bargain, the theory 
suggested, the entire pact was liable to unravel.7
These arguments proved robust during the 1986-2004 oil 
bust period, when oil rents were strangled by a 20-year 
glut in global supply. Despite intense fiscal privations 
that squeezed rentier distribution, none of the six Gulf 
monarchies raised energy prices or re-imposed taxation 
that had been phased out during the boom period.8  But 
in recent years something has changed. Initial signs that 
longstanding subsidy policy commitments were weakening 
came in 2010 when Iran launched a major increase in 
energy prices. Dubai followed with a more modest reform 
in 2011.9 Increases elsewhere, delayed by pan-Arab 
uprisings, began to unfold in 2014. (Fig. 1)  
These price increases were greeted by a flood of complaints 
in social media. In Saudi Arabia, commentary ranged 
from outright support to personal attacks on ministers, 
technocrats and even royal family members. Cautious 
Saudis began tweeting pictures of King Abdullah 
unaccompanied by text. The portraits evoked the late 
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ruler’s patronage of the poor as commentary on his 
successor’s turn toward extraction. Physical protests broke 
out in populous hydrocarbon exporters, including Iran and 
Algeria, as well as in Oman, where citizens picketed the 
Ministry of Oil and Gas after gasoline price increases. 
The outcry over rising prices was met with stepped-up 
repression in most of the affected countries.10 The use of 
mild repression to quell breaches of the state-society pact is 
predicted by early rentier works, while later writing argues 
that the state prefers to head off dissent with patronage 
and consultation.11 The ongoing crackdowns on speech 
along with the state-directed murder of a Saudi dissident 
in Istanbul provided further evidence that benevolent 
characteristics of Gulf autocratic rule were eroding.
These developments suggest that a reassessment and 
update to theory is due. Rents certainly remain of primary 
importance to governance in these autocratic export 
states, but some rules that theorists have advanced over 
the past four decades now appear more like guidelines; and 
guidelines can be disregarded when circumstances allow.
Evidence: Subsidy reform and tax increases
The subsidy reform that swept the Middle East since the 2014 
decline in oil prices is undeniable. Over a four-year period, 
at least nine countries raised prices on energy products 
that, in most cases, had been fixed at low levels for many 
years. Reformers include all six of the wealthy Persian Gulf 
10   Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and Amnesty International reported losses in civil liberties and political freedoms, and increased state 
repression since 2010 in several Arab countries, including much of the Gulf. Bahrain and the UAE saw the largest decreases in personal freedom, 
according to Freedom House.
11   J. E. Peterson, “The GCC States: Participation, Opposition and the Fraying of the Social Contract” (London: London School of Economics, Kuwait 
Program on Development, Governance and Globalization in Gulf States, 2012); Matthew Gray, “A Theory of ‘Late Rentierism’ in the Arab States of the 
Gulf” (Scholarly Paper, Doha: Georgetown University Center for International and Regional Studies, 2011).
12   Krane, “Political Enablers of Energy Subsidy Reform in Middle Eastern Oil Exporters”; Jim Krane and Elsie Hung, “Energy Subsidy Reform in the 
Persian Gulf: The End of the Big Oil Giveaway,” Issue Brief (Houston: Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, April 28, 2016), http://www.
bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research_document/0e7a6eb7/BI-Brief-042816-CES_GulfSubsidy.pdf; Glada Lahn, “Fuel, Food and Utilities Price 
Reforms in the GCC: A Wake-up Call for Business,” research paper (London: Chatham House, June 2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/
chathamhouse/publications/research/Food%20Fuel%20and%20Utilities%20Price%20Reforms%20in%20the%20GCC%20A%20Wake-up%20Call%20
for%20Business.pdf.
13   Krane, “Political Enablers of Energy Subsidy Reform in Middle Eastern Oil Exporters.”
14   In 2018, the Omani government launched its National Subsidy System which allows for low-income Omani citizens to buy up to 200 liters of gasoline 
each month at a price capped at 180 baisas (47 US cents) per liter. Some 300,000 Omani citizens had registered as of October 2018. See: National 
Subsidy System website https://nss.gov.om/site/home 
monarchies (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain), petroleum exporters 
Algeria and Iran, as well as Egypt, a mid-sized producer that 
is currently a net importer. These price increases have been 
covered elsewhere,12 but Fig. 1 provides detail.
As Fig. 1 shows, the initial increases took place alongside 
a decline in the crude oil market price, providing a 
fiscal impetus – as well as political cover – for reform.13 
However, some of the largest increases came in 2018, 
well after oil prices had recovered much lost ground. 
This suggests that the subsidy rollbacks were driven by 
determination to stem demand growth. By late 2018, with 
Brent prices nearing $85 per barrel, none of the countries 
had rescinded the increases in domestic energy prices 
except Oman, where 2017 protests led the government to 
cap gasoline prices for 10 months. In 2018, the government 
revived a small gasoline subsidy and restricted it to low-
income Omanis, forcing expatriates and higher income 
citizens to buy fuel at unsubsidized prices.14 
What about the tax increases? In January 2018, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE imposed the Gulf ’s first-ever value-
added tax, imposing an extra five percent price hike on 
nearly all goods and services. Bahrain followed suit in 
2019. The remaining three monarchies have announced 
plans to impose VATs of their own, demurring on launch 
dates. The Saudi imposition of VAT, higher utility, and 
fuel prices was partly offset by the launch of the Citizen’s 
Account program, a government cash transfer that has 
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provided monthly payments ranging from $80 to $250 to 
the lower-income half of the citizen population.15
Where subsidies have not been completely lifted, their 
provision has often been narrowed to citizens, or even 
poor citizens, as the examples in Oman and Saudi Arabia 
illustrate. The UAE and Qatar had long ago split electricity 
and water tariffs, retaining cheaper (or free in Qatar) 
power and water for citizens. Bahrain and Kuwait have also 
developed differentiated prices based on citizenship. So, 
even as citizens are asked to pay something for a previously 
15   Vivian Nereim, “Saudi Arabia Begins Payouts to Buffer Belt-Tightening Blow,” Bloomberg, December 21, 2017, https: //www.bloomberg.com /news /
articles /2017-12-21/saudi-arabia-begins-payouts-to-buffer-belt-tightening-blow.
16   Krane, Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf.
free service, or pay a bit more than was customary, 
foreigners have shouldered much larger increases. These 
actions appear to violate rentier claims about inviolability 
of subsidies, even as they conform to academic portrayals 
of citizenship as a source of economic privilege
Evidence: Energy intensity
The main reason behind the imposition of tax and subsidy 
reform is the rising consumption of exportable hydrocarbons 
within these states. Four decades of compounding demand 
Figure 1. (Source16) 
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growth now diverts substantial shares of oil and gas away 
from export markets. (Fig. 2) In 2008, two of the six GCC 
states – Kuwait and the UAE – became net importers of 
natural gas. Were demand growth of oil not slowed or halted, 
some or all of the six countries would see their oil exports – 
the economic underpinning of all six – put at risk.
Figure 2. (Source17)
Documentation of the so-called “cannibalization” 
phenomenon has been produced by financial analysts18 and 
think-tanks19, but has yet to be scrutinized in the rentier 
theoretical literature.20 All of the autocracies depicted 
in the bottom right quadrant of Fig. 3 (the most energy-
intense and least democratic) are oil exporters. Table 1 
also shows that most Middle Eastern exporters were less 
democratic and consumed more oil per-capita than the 
average in the OECD and the world. Thus a reassessment 
of oil’s role on the state is due; not only as an example of an 
historic omission from the rentier literature, but because 
energy intensity is a product of rentier governance, caused 
in large part by the distributive mandates of the rentier 
social contract. 
17   Krane 2019.
18   Brad Bourland and Paul Gamble, “Saudi Arabia’s Coming Oil and Fiscal Challenge” (Research report, Riyadh: Jadwa Investment, 2011); Heidy 
Rehman, “Saudi Petrochemicals: End of the Magic Porridge Pot?” (Citibank research report, Dubai: Citi Equities Research, 2012).
19   Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, “Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia” (London: Chatham House, 2011); Glada 
Lahn, Paul Stevens, and Felix Preston, “Saving Oil and Gas in the Gulf” (London: Chatham House, August 2013); Krane, “Guzzling in the Gulf: 
The Monarchies Face a Threat From Within”; Krane, “Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy in the Gulf Monarchies,” 2015; Jean-Francois 
Seznec, “Saudi Energy Changes: The End of the Rentier State” (Washington: Atlantic Council, March 2016), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/
publications/Saudi_Energy_Changes_web_0323.pdf.
20   Although my work does cover this issue. See:  Krane, “Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy in the Gulf Monarchies,” 2014.
Theoretical amendments
The evidence shows that rentier governments have begun 
engaging their citizens with energy policymaking in ways 
that do not follow the script laid out by rentier state theory. 
Governments which (probably unintentionally) incubated 
high energy intensity in their economies are now revoking 
supposedly sacrosanct energy benefits. Citizens are 
largely accepting their losses without making demands for 
democracy. These developments imply that rentier theory 
needs updating. 
Oil demand 
per capita 
(Barrels of oil/
person/yr)
Democracy 
Index
(1 to 8, min-
max) 
OECD avg. 13.3 7.2
World avg. 4.7 5.5
Libya 16.3 4.8
Iraq 9.3 4.1
Algeria 4.0 3.8
Kuwait 47.4 3.8
Oman 14.7 3.3
Qatar 35.3 3.2
Bahrain 16.5 2.9
UAE 30.0 2.5
Iran 9.7 2.0
Saudi Arabia 35.8 1.8
Table 1: Middle East oil exporters tend toward lower 
democracy and higher oil demand than the average globally 
or in the OECD (2013 data; source: IEA, EIU)
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First, as regards subsidy reform, we should acknowledge 
that the domestic subsidization of primary exports 
comprises an encumbrance on the economy. Left intact 
over the long term, domestic resource distribution can 
undermine the rent stream and destabilize the governance 
structure. Regimes should be expected to take action to 
lessen the strain. 
Second, academics’ central misunderstanding about 
subsidies is that they are inflexible. By portraying subsidies 
as rights, theory implies that they cannot be reformed 
without upsetting stability. On the contrary, I argue that 
subsidies are ultimately more destabilizing to rentier 
21   Tsai argues that the subsidy portion of the social contract is being shifted to the state employment sector, where premium salaries and benefits 
continue to be available for citizens.  I.-Tsung Tsai, “Political Economy of Energy Policy Reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Implications of 
Paradigm Change in the Rentier Social Contract,” Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018): 89–96, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.04.028.
systems than the corrective retrenchment actions that have 
occurred since 2014.
Citizen benefits can be more accurately depicted as 
“customary privileges” that may be restricted in ways 
that once appeared illegitimate: towards low-income 
citizens or “reasonable” levels of consumption, or replaced 
by alternate handouts. As long as aggregate patronage 
remains roughly constant, regimes appear to have some 
control over the type of welfare goods and services they 
provide.21 In other words, social contracts are less rigid 
than portrayed in the rentier literature. 
Figure 3: Oil exports tend to correlate with lower levels of democracy. Data is from 2013. (Source: Oil rents: World Bank 
World Development Indicators; Democracy index: Economist Intelligence Unit)
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These amendments provide theoretical allowance for the 
reforms that have already begun in the rentier heartland 
of the Gulf. Thus modified, theory can anticipate the 
likelihood for regimes to continue to streamline social 
welfare policies in the interest of preserving power. 
How should theory deal with the extraordinary oil intensity 
of the Gulf monarchies? By acknowledging that the 
resource curse hypothesis that “oil bolsters autocracy” has 
a follow-on stage, whereby autocratic policies incentivize 
domestic oil demand. That is because energy is leveraged 
as a tool of state development and political control. 
The practices of rentier policymaking have expanded 
beyond the boundaries assumed by existing theory. We 
may be witnessing the top-down imposition of a new 
social contract featuring increased regime flexibility 
in social policy, implemented under a heightened level 
of repression.22 These developments do not signal a 
reduced regime reliance on rents or the demise of rentier 
or “allocative” governance.  World Bank data show a 
continued large role for oil rents in GDP and for rent 
distribution via public wages in state spending. Instead, 
the levying of low-level taxation and reductions in energy 
benefits look more like coordinated course corrections. 
Regimes are streamlining bloated social contracts to 
contain the distortionary effects of policies that have 
remained in place since the 1970s. At that time, poverty 
alleviation was a much larger concern. Today, oil intensity 
is a countervailing worry for younger ruling elites updating 
rentier governance for new generations.
22   Sultan al-Qassemi, “The Gulf ’s New Social Contract” (Middle East Institute, February 8, 2016), http://www.mei.edu/content/article/gulfs-new-social-
contract; Tsai, “Political Economy of Energy Policy Reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Implications of Paradigm Change in the Rentier Social 
Contract.”
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SAUDI ARABIA AS A MODEL
A landing strategy for Saudi Arabia 
Ishac Diwan, Columbia University
With rising population and incomes, the “rentier” mode of 
development in Saudi Arabia has long been unsustainable. 
While the issue of fiscal stabilization will occupy policy-
making in Saudi Arabia in the short and medium terms, 
the long-term challenge of finding new sources of growth 
to complement oil has only been made starker by the 
recent drop in oil prices. Analysis of the prospects for 
such reforms in KSA has long been divided between two 
opposite camps: those who believe that the inadequacies 
of the rentier model will necessarily usher a doomsday 
scenario sooner or later, regardless of economic policies; 
and those who believe the impending crisis can be met 
by moving from the current mono-sector economy to a 
modern and diversified knowledge based economy OECD-
style.
The optimistic scenario recommends that KSA becomes 
some form of Dubai on steroids, where Saudi youth ends 
up managing hordes of migrants in a super competitive 
economy driven by private initiative and serving as a bridge 
between East and West (Vision 2030). Steffen Hertog’s 
paper carefully dissects why this vision remains a fantasy. 
Given the Saudi starting point, with a large population and 
an economy structurally dependent on oil, it would take 
many decades before KSA can ween itself out of oil and 
insure a good standard of living to its growing population 
by diversifying its production in other competitive areas. 
No easily discernible economic policy could deliver the 
needed transformations before the crisis point arrives.
The doomsday scenario also makes unrealistic 
assumptions, however. The oil shock of 2014, coming 
on the heels of a post-Arab Spring fiscal expansion, has 
caused a large deficit in the government budget. Given 
its existing reserves, KSA can borrow abroad and sell 
assets to theoretically finance at least 10 years of deficits 
at the current level. The government could therefore 
continue kicking the can down the road for a while without 
considering serious reforms, but this would lead down the 
road to bankruptcy. However, it is not realistic to assume a 
continuation of the current socio-economic path, even as 
it becomes increasingly apparent that it leads into a wall. 
Too many interests have skin in the game to allow such a 
disastrous scenario to unfold unopposed.
While the first pessimistic scenario is more likely than the 
second dream scenario, both fail to draw the contours of a 
reasonable vision for KSA in an age where oil revenues will 
remain sizable but not sufficient to sustain the past model 
of development. 
Youth employment and rentier adaptation
To develop a reasonable landing scenario, it is necessary 
to be clear on its objectives. There is no value to 
diversification of exports per se, at least as long as oil 
revenues are sufficient to cover import needs. Rather, the 
key goal for KSA should be to gainfully employ its educated 
youth in high enough productivity jobs. While it made 
sense in the past to import labor to build the country, by 
now, there are cohorts of educated Saudi students coming 
out of school that need to be gainfully, and productively 
employed. The situation is thus profoundly different, and 
it requires profoundly different economic incentives and 
structures.
The existing economic model has become anachronistic. 
It is only a bit of a caricature to state that the current 
growth model rests on a two separate deals: one deal 
with businesses for a free hand at importing labor from 
abroad, and one with citizens for guaranteed public sector 
jobs and life-long support. With its current population 
of 20.8 million (General Authority for Statistics 2018), 
it can be computed, based on World Bank data (World 
Bank Indicators, 2018), that oil revenues were only $6,600 
per capita in 2016, compared to about twice as much in 
1990, on the eve of the previous oil crisis. KSA has clearly 
outgrown the current arrangement.
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The government is no longer hiring all Saudis who are 
willing to work. Already, unemployment is officially at 12.8 
percent, 33.1 percent for women, and 31.3 for youth (age 
25-29), and rising (General Authority for Statistics 2018).
Oil rents are not sufficient to finance anything close to 
current consumption levels for the population, and this can 
only get worse over time in the absence of a new source of 
growth.
The main problem with the current economic path 
is that under the current system, nationals are simply 
not employable in large numbers in the private sector. 
Dwindling oil revenues will provide less income to 
nationals over time. If cheap labor continues to be freely 
imported, Saudi will continue to shun working in the 
private sector until they become much poorer. Significant 
policy reforms are needed to offer them incentives to join 
the labor force well before their incomes decline to expat 
wage levels – which tend to be the lowest global wages at 
any level of skills. 
By employing its nationals more productively, KSA can 
aspire to become a normal oil economy - one that exports 
mostly oil, but that derives much greater national income 
from the work of its population. This would require 
radically scaling back the massive import of foreign 
labor. In the Norway model of a normal oil economy, 
Saudi workers would replace expats over time, mainly in 
the private service sector. The economy would remain 
dominated by oil. Many public sector firms will continue 
to play an important economic role, employing specialized 
Saudi workers (in the oil sector, health, academia, telecom, 
finance). 
The current labor arrangements place a heavy disincentive 
on nationals from joining the labor force. Yet, huge gains 
could be made if they were instead encouraged to do so, 
both because national labor is grossly under-employed, 
1   In comparison, Norway’s imports to GDP ratio is 35%. Its exports to GDP ratio is about 50% GDP, like KSA. Its exports include Crude Petroleum 
($22.7B) (https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/2709/), Petroleum Gas ($21.6B) (https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/2711/), Non-
fillet Fresh Fish ($5.24B) (https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/0302/), Refined Petroleum ($3.23B) (https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/
hs92/2710/), and Raw Aluminium ($2.59B) (https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/7601/).
but also because it is increasingly well educated, thus 
increasing the opportunity cost of low participation. 
Currently, only 40.3 percent of the working age is in 
the labor force, and only 35.1 percent of the population 
works (the rest is unemployed) - see General Authority 
for Statistics 2018. This compares to employment rates of 
about 60 percent in the OECD. Low national participation 
rates are largely due to very low participation by women 
(17.4 percent), but men’s participation is not high by 
international standards either at 62.1 percent (General 
Authority for Statistics 2018).
Employing young Saudi women and men productively 
would create a great boost of growth, and it would save on 
foreign exchange now being remitted by expats abroad. At 
the end of this transition, millions of expats would have 
returned to their home countries. The Saudi economy will 
then become possibly smaller than it is today, but it will be 
employing a large share of its own population productively. 
It may have a lower GDP, but it would have a larger 
National Income. Oil will remain central, but it will have a 
much larger multiplier effect in terms of national income. 
In a normalized Saudi economy, one can envisage that 
in the next phase (say the next 10 years), a large share of 
the Saudi labor force (say half) will remain employed in 
government. In such an economy, except in a few areas of 
comparative advantage, not many firms would produce 
globally competitive tradables. Those that do compete 
globally now will be unlikely to survive given that unskilled 
wages will rise, and on the fiscal front, subsidies will fall 
and taxes will be introduced. Perhaps a select few tradable 
sectors could develop, such as religious tourism and 
sectors with linkages to petroleum. Together with oil, 
these would generate foreign exchange earnings of 40 to 50 
percent of GDP, which under normal conditions, should be 
sufficient to finance the needed imports of a normalized 
economy.1
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To give a sense of magnitudes of the potential gains if 
national labor was employed more effectively, a simple 
projection model suggests that with participation rates 
growing from 40 percent to 60 percent of the working age 
population, and unemployment dropping to its natural 
rate, non-oil national income would more than double if 
the additional workers join the non-oil sector at current 
productivity levels. Improvements in labor productivity 
would add to this growth rate further. Altogether, it can 
be estimated that this addition to national wealth would 
ultimately be comparable in magnitude to the kingdom’s 
oil wealth itself.
Obstacles to transitioning to a normal economy
There are multiple political economy challenges to the 
establishment of such a “normal” Saudi economy. The 
economic elites would want to keep their privileged 
access to cheap foreign workers. They will hesitate to 
make the investments needed to create jobs with the level 
of productivity that can make them attractive to Saudi 
workers. They will claim that the quality of the education 
and the attitudes of the population are not favorable to 
their employment. National workers will resist working in 
the private sector at wages lower than those their parents 
earned in the public sector. In time, as they become less 
dependent on rent distribution, they will start questioning 
the autocracy of their rulers. 
Besides political economy issues however, the main 
economic challenge of the transition to a normal economy 
is to create productive jobs. It is easy enough to just 
create jobs - in the public sector and security forces, or 
by replacing migrants in labor-intensive private sector 
occupations. To pay the youth in ways that preserve their 
consumption levels close to those of their parents, the first 
method would expand fiscal deficits and raise public debt. 
The second method would lead to higher non-tradables 
prices if productivity does not rise, which would erode the 
standards of living of the whole population.
2   This assumes that each job requires on average an investment in machinery of $250,000, which is 20 times an average wage.
For labor productivity to rise, private investment will 
have to rise. Indeed, private sector firms will need to not 
only pay sufficiently to attract Saudi workers, but they 
also will need to invest in more capital and skill-intensive 
production methods, and to start training their workers so 
they can improve their productivity. In the service sector 
in particular, labor-intensive jobs now manned by expats 
need to disappear and be replaced by more productive jobs 
occupied by Saudis. Each Saudi worker would need to be 
equipped with skills and machines to accomplish the tasks 
being delivered now by several departing low-wage expats 
in order to be able to earn a multiple of their unskilled 
wages. There are two key challenges to such a scenario.
First, there is a need to improve substantially the business 
climate and to enlarge access to credit so as to allow for the 
formation of new firms that can innovate and create the 
needed highly productive jobs. More targeted industrial 
policies can help speed up the adjustment of SMEs to the 
new input price structure. For new SMEs that disrupt the 
labor-intensive way of doing business to play a leading role 
in the transformation of various industries toward more 
productive structures, there is a need to encourage the 
(creative) destruction of the old inefficient firms, so that 
the new firms have space to increase their market shares. 
Second, the required investment will generate large new 
aggregate financing needs. To create about one million jobs 
every five years, they can be of the order of $0.5 trillion 
over ten years.2 These funds will have to come from the 
national banking and financial sectors, FDI, or from public 
funds. At the macro level, this creates a trade-off with the 
speed of adjustment. Large amounts of public financing 
of deficits will end up crowding out funds that need to 
go instead to the private sector. Given that the private 
investment required for a successful structural reform 
strategy is large, there is therefore a global finance trade-
off. In our back of the envelope calculations, it would not 
be possible to wait 10 years to adjust while at the same 
time creating one million new good jobs. Thus, slowing 
adjustment too much will constrain how much can be 
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invested to upgrade jobs and improve labor productivity.
The considerations above, both financial, and political, 
suggest that the reform program would ideally advance 
at a deliberate but gradual pace, taking advantage of the 
existence of a sizable fiscal space to smooth the cost of 
reforms over time but at the same time moving deliberately 
along a pre-set multi-year agenda. It is true that cases 
where ambitious reforms were carried-out gradually way 
before crisis point have been historically rare. Moreover, 
the challenge of foresight and restraint is contrary to 
the rentier tendency for expenditures to rise to the 
level of revenues, “kicking the can” as long as possible. 
But countries with significant fiscal space and a clear 
understanding of their need to change their growth path 
in fundamental ways are also rare. And it is precisely this 
coincidence that sets KSA apart.
Important elements of the reforms needed for KSA to 
become a normal economy are already in place. Vision 
2030 focuses on many aspects of this agenda. Taxes are 
rising and subsidies are coming down slowly. Saudization 
policies, which were started a decade ago, are becoming 
more binding, and expats are becoming more expensive 
and are starting to leave in droves. And strong policy 
signals have been sent to encourage more innovative 
SMEs to enter domestic markets. But overall, the program 
projected by Vision 2030 is not sufficiently focused on the 
creation of jobs for nationals and is overly concerned with 
an unattainable diversification agenda. As such, it remains 
blurred and lacks credibility. This is partly to be expected 
as structural reforms of this magnitude necessarily 
involve trial and error. But it is now apparent that it is not 
realistic, nor necessary, to aim at a rapid and brutal fiscal 
stabilization. Instead, to send an unmistakable signal that 
productive jobs are the priority, Saudization policies would 
need to become more ambitious. At the same time, there 
is a need for a much more ambitious effort to improve the 
business climate, which remains opaque and constraining, 
and to open up the access to finance, which is now 
severely restricted for new firms. It is also becoming clear 
that risky mega-projects (such as Neon city) that could 
easily turn into white elephants should be replaced by 
pragmatic industrial policies that help whole sub-sectors to 
modernize rapidly and adjust to new input prices.
For any of this to happen, the most immediate challenge 
is for the Saudi elite and increasingly restive population to 
coalesce around a reasonable landing strategy, as opposed 
to pie-in-the sky plans that do not amount to a credible 
plan around which economic and political actors can get 
organized. 
General Authority for Statistics, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
2018:  https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/labor_
market_q3.pdf
World Bank. World Bank Indicators, 2018. 
https://data.worldbank.org
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What would the Saudi economy have to look like to be  
“post-rentier”?
Steffen Hertog, London School of Economics
Most oil producers in the Global South have espoused 
plans to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons 
pretty much since the onset of oil production. Yet very 
few have managed to transcend their hydrocarbons 
dependence – and those who have done so are mid-
level rentiers like Malaysia, with annual resource rents 
per capita in the hundreds of dollars per year. High-rent 
countries like the GCC monarchies, Libya, Brunei, or 
Equatorial-Guinea, where per capita rents amount to many 
thousands of dollars, all remain deeply dependent on oil 
income despite decades of diversification plans.1
Why is post-oil diversification so difficult? Researchers 
point to a number of explanations, including economic 
factors like the Dutch Disease and the negative impact 
of revenue volatility, as well as political factors like 
elite-level rent-seeking and the quality of institutions in 
oil-rich countries. These apply to different degrees in 
different economies, yet the track record of diversification 
is generally poor. To help account for this puzzle, this 
research note will point to an easily overlooked obstacle to 
economic diversification away from oil: the sheer scale of 
economic change required to transition away from a high-
income oil economy to a post-oil economy.
This memo will spell out what transition to a “post-oil” 
economy would mean in the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
MENA region’s most important rentier state. The key 
finding is that to support a “normal”, non-oil fiscal system 
and a “normal”, non-oil labor market, the Saudi private 
sector would need to undergo drastic changes. It would 
need to grow dramatically if it were to support current 
levels of state spending through non-oil domestic taxes, 
all the while dealing with severe contractionary and 
inflationary effects of taxation. Private employment of 
1   https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41825-017-0007-2
2   See the MoF’s 2018 budget statement, which contains an overview if 2017 spending and expenditure categories: https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/
financialreport/budget2018/Pages/default.aspx 
Saudis would have to grow by a factor of four or more in 
order for the kingdom’s labor market to resemble that of 
non-oil economies. The path to such a non-oil economy 
is, at best, very long, measured in generations rather than 
decades.
The Saudi economy’s state dependence
Although the size of the Saudi private sector has grown 
significantly since the 1970s, the Saudi economy remains 
highly dependent on state spending, which in turn is 
largely financed through oil income. Even after the 
considerable fiscal reforms of 2015-17, recurrent taxes and 
fees only accounted for slightly more than 10 percent of 
total state spending in 2017.2 
The government continues to account for about two-
thirds of all employment of Saudi citizens (figure 1), a 
dramatically higher share than the 10-20 percent in most 
other countries.
Figure 1: Share of public in total employment of citizens
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Salaries constitute close to 50 percent of all Saudi 
government expenditure, compared to a typical ratio of 
20-30 percent around the world. Pay for the minority of 
Saudis employed in the private sector is lower than in 
government. Because much of the income of the foreign 
workers who dominate the private sector is remitted home, 
household demand in the private economy therefore 
depends on spending from government employees and 
thereby is indirectly fed by government.
The kingdom has seen significant economic adjustment 
measures since 2015, including a brutal corruption 
crackdown, slashing of government capital expenditure, 
and delayed or cancelled contractor payments. Most 
of these have affected economic elites rather than the 
population at large, however. When fiscal adjustment really 
hit households in the shape of public sector allowance cuts, 
the measures were reversed after a couple of months. The 
recent introduction of VAT and higher energy prices were 
accompanied by generous compensation measures for 
Saudi households. Among the major budget items, salary 
spending has increased the fastest in 2017 and is set to do 
the same in 2018.3 Broad-based wealth distribution and 
sensitivity to the popular mood have continued even under 
the kingdom’s new, much more ruthless leadership.
The private sector – while treated more harshly – remains as 
deeply state-dependent as Saudi households, both indirectly 
through the consumption spending of government 
employees and directly through contracts and subsidized 
inputs. The ratio of private sector GDP to state expenditure 
has remained in a steady state ratio of about 1.2-1.3 since 
the 1990s, meaning that private economic activity closely 
tracks state spending. The ratio of government to private 
consumption in Saudi Arabia is about three times higher 
than the international average, and much of the private 
consumption is indirectly state-induced.
The private sector has far to go to create an economy 
that is driven by self-sustaining private demand, not 
3   For 2018 and 2018 Saudi budget data and details on social transfers see https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/financialreport/budget2018/Pages/default.aspx 
and  https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/financialreport/budget2019/Pages/default.aspx 
4   See the official budget statement from December 2017:  https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/financialreport/budget2018/Pages/default.aspx
5   https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-revenue.htm
rent-financed government spending. But how far? One 
way of answering this question is to estimate what the 
Saudi private sector would have to look like to sustain a 
non-rentier system of a similar size to the current rentier 
economy. We will look at two key aspects of the non-
rentier economy: the ability to finance of state operations 
through domestic taxes rather than external rents and the 
private sector’s capacity to be the main provider of citizen 
employment. These two can be understood as minimal 
criteria for a “post-rentier” economy and reflect economic 
structures in all of the world’s (non-Communist) non-
rentier economies.
Taxes
States in non-rentier economies are largely financed 
by domestic taxes, and these taxes are derived from 
private economy activity. They can be levied on profits, 
employment or consumption and be borne by owners 
of capital, workers or consumers. But no matter who 
takes the hit, the income to pay these taxes needs to be 
generated in the private economy (unless the state taxes 
itself ). Assuming that the kingdom wants to maintain its 
current level of state activity, we therefore estimate which 
level of taxation the Saudi private sector would have to 
bear to maintain recent levels of state spending.
Saudi state spending reached 926 billion SAR in 2017 and 
planned spending for 2018 is 978b SAR, while income 
from recurrent taxes and fees in 2017 amounted to less 
than 100b SAR.4 Taxes would have to fill a gap of close 
to 900 billion SAR (about a third of Saudi GDP) to fully 
finance state operations planned for 2018. How large 
would the private sector need to be to be able to bear 
such a burden? We use OECD taxation levels to provide 
benchmarks. The average OECD tax/GDP ratio is 34 
percent, the lowest being 23 percent (Ireland) and the 
highest 45 percent (Denmark). The current Saudi tax/GDP 
ratio is about four percent.5 
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Table 1 shows that the Saudi private sector would have to 
grow significantly to be able to realistically finance current 
government expenditure through taxes. Even at Danish 
taxation levels, the private sector would still need to grow 
by 29.8 percent to fill the financing gap.
Table 1: How large would private sector GDP have to be to 
support current government spending under different tax/
GDP ratios? 
* assuming the GDP share of the private economy in KSA 
reaches the OECD average of 78%
At current levels of private sector activity, Saudi 
government expenditure levels simply cannot be tax-
financed – especially if we consider that for reasons of 
political feasibility and competitiveness an Ireland-level tax 
ratio is much more realistic than a Danish one.
6   https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/How-Strong-are-Fiscal-Multipliers-in-the-GCC-24715
In practice, given weak private demand generation and 
strong dependence on government stimulus, increasing 
taxes would lead to significant contraction of the Saudi 
private sector. There is an acute trade-off between raising 
non-oil revenue and private sector growth. Conservatively 
assuming a fiscal multiplier of 0.5 (based on IMF 
estimates)6, raising taxes by 900b SAR would shave 450 
SAR off GDP – more than a third of the size of the current 
private economy, while creating significant inflation. This 
makes the growth assumptions needed for the above 
taxation scenarios even more implausible. Total factor 
productivity and labor productivity would have to increase 
dramatically to allow such private growth. They have, 
however, been stagnant since the 1970s.
Employment
Most employment in non-oil economies is created in 
the private sector. How many jobs would the Saudi 
private sector have to provide to make local labor market 
structures converge on those of non-oil countries? We 
again use the OECD as benchmark. Figure 2 below shows 
the share of public in total employment in the OECD. The 
average of 20 percent is drastically lower than the Saudi 
share of about 65 percent.
Figure 2: Public sector employment as a percentage of total employment across the OECD (2009 and 2013)
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In estimating how many private jobs would be needed 
for the kingdom to converge on OECD levels, we first 
build a scenario in which total employment levels for 
Saudis stay constant. In this case, 2.27 million jobs would 
need to move from the public to the private sector – a 
growth of 120 percent on the private side (see table 2). At 
a compound annual growth rate of five percent for private 
Saudi jobs, this would take 16 years; at a three percent  
growth rate, 27 years. In principle, shrinkage of state 
employment would allow lowering of state expenditure 
and thereby reduce the fiscal burden on the private sector 
estimated in the previous section. Less expenditure would 
also reduce government-induced private demand, however, 
in turn making it harder to create private growth and 
jobs. There are millions of low-cost foreign workers in the 
Saudi private sector that could in principle be replaced by 
Saudis. Attempt to induce such substitution in the past 
have, however, created considerable costs for business and 
a shrinkage in aggregate employment. (See Leber in this 
collection).
Table 2: Current and hypothetical OECD-like distribution 
of jobs in Saudi Arabia
In practice, the Saudi workforce continues to grow at about 
two percent per year, so job creation would have to be 
considerably faster to avoid quickly rising unemployment 
or continued reliance on government jobs.  
The above scenario assumed a constant Saudi workforce. 
What if Saudi Arabia aspired to OECD-type employment 
ratios? The current share of Saudis in working age who 
hold jobs is 35.4 percent, a uniquely low number in global 
comparison. The OECD average is 67.8 percent.7 To reach 
7   https://data.oecd.org/emp/employment-rate.htm
an OECD-level public/private job ratio and participation 
rate, private sector jobs for Saudis would need to grow 
by 321 percent to almost eight million (table 3). At a five 
percent CAGR of private Saudi jobs, this would take 30 
years; at three percent growth, 49 years.
Table 3: Current and hypothetical OECD-like distribution 
of jobs in Saudi Arabia assuming an OECD-level 
employment ratio
This estimate again abstracts from future growth of 
the Saudi working age population, which is likely to 
expand by about five million within the next 20 years. 
Accommodating this new generation at the average OECD 
employment ratio would require the creation of about 3.65 
million more jobs, of which 2.88 million would need to 
come from the private sector. This could only be borne by 
a substantially larger private sector. At current (low) Saudi 
private pay levels, just the salaries of 7.96 million Saudis in 
the private sector would gobble up more than 60 percent 
of private sector GDP, compared to the current ratio of 17 
percent.
In sum, even at private employment growth rates that 
have never been achieved among mid- to high-income 
countries, Saudi Arabia would need decades to reshape 
its labor market to reach the OECD benchmark of high 
employment and (relatively) low state dependency. 
The above scenarios are purely illustrative and should 
not necessarily be a target for policy-makers. They do, 
however, give an idea of how far the kingdom is from 
a “normal” economy based on private production and 
employment, and how heavily state-dependent the labor 
market is.
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Conclusion
The point of this note is not prediction or prescriptive 
scenario-building; it is creating a theoretical benchmark 
to assess how far Saudi Arabia is from a post-oil economy. 
Moving beyond hydrocarbons dependence is a valid 
ambition, but the depth of the structural change needed is 
often underestimated. Even under ideal conditions, it will 
be impossible to become “post-rentier” by 2030 and hard 
to imagine even by 2050. The maths are quite similar for 
other high-rent countries, including those of the GCC.
The note has assumed that Saudi Arabia will remain 
a high-income country. There is in fact a quicker way 
to become post-rentier: through pauperization due to 
falling and eventually vanishing resource rents. The fiscal 
constraints created by lower oil rents would sooner or 
later lead to lower government spending, which will in 
turn also shrink the private sector – but quite likely at a 
proportionally lower rate, as happened during the austere 
1980s and 1990s. Relatively speaking, the economy will 
be less oil dependent, but also poorer. Given the current 
oil price environment and the kingdom’s fiscal and 
overseas reserves, this is not an immediate prospect. Yet 
it might well happen before the structural conditions for a 
prosperous post-rentier age are in place.
34
Resisting rentierism: Labor market reforms in Saudi Arabia
Andrew Leber, Harvard University
The mounting number of mechanisms linking oil wealth 
to political outcomes risks obscuring how the practice of 
politics affects the distribution of these rents. Explaining 
who gets what, why and how under authoritarian regimes, 
and how these choices change, is of particular interest in 
the Middle East and North Africa, where states control 
significant non-tax revenues (see Figure 1) and where 
changes in the distribution of state revenues can have a 
considerable impact on citizens’ welfare. In this memo 
– through a case study of labor market reforms in Saudi 
Arabia – I suggest that instances of “rentier distribution” 
provides us with a window into broader questions of how 
resources are distributed under authoritarianism.
Theories in the rentier and “resource curse” literatures 
(Ross 2015: 243-248) are most commonly associated with 
the (usually negative) effects of oil on democracy. These 
approaches have typically fared better at predicting cross-
national variation than change over time. Assumptions 
that the political fortunes of rulers closely track energy 
markets tend to over-predict the collapse of resource-rich 
regimes (Lowi 2009; Gause 2015), while statistical tests 
have struggled to find a consistent effect of resource wealth 
on degrees of democracy (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Liou 
and Musgrave 2013). At the same time, explaining the 
political trajectories of oil-rich countries through durable 
institutions or founding “pacts” (Smith 2007) in turn 
overlooks the potential for substantial political change as 
regimes age (Slater 2010). Inequalities of distribution – 
even in the most generous of rentier states – can empower 
new social classes or generate new challenges to regime 
stability over the years (i.e. Chaudhry 1997; Okruhlik 1999; 
Gengler 2015).
Existing understandings of authoritarianism struggle 
to account for change in political “choices” about rent 
distribution. Perhaps rulers stand by durable coalitions of 
support formed at critical junctures in regime trajectories 
(Waldner and Smith 2015); or they cater to whichever 
constituencies are best organized to lobby for their 
Figure 1: Countries of the world arranged in order of aid and gas/oil rents per capita (2010 values, Ross and Mahdavy 2014). 
Select countries labeled, MENA countries marked in black.
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preferred policies (Karl 1997: 16-17); or they spend more 
in general on social services when resource booms permit 
(Morrison 2009) or simply whenever they feel threatened. 
Yet we know that top-down changes in authoritarian 
distribution can occur even in the most authoritarian of 
countries (Shirk 1993; Wallace 2014), changes that are 
difficult to account for when we assume that regimes 
are captive to social constituencies or the movements of 
international markets. 
Even with rentier wealth, rulers have to make choices. My 
research suggests that rulers will seek to alter their political 
coalitions – the collection of social groups the regime 
takes to be its supporters – when they worry that they are 
retaining ineffectual allies at the cost of cultivating active 
sources of support. As Jessie Moritz notes in highlighting 
the limits to co-optation via rent distribution, there is 
plenty of cause for autocrats to worry when strategies of 
social control fall flat. Rulers can seek to remake coalitions 
through policies that distribute wealth or make costly 
symbolic concessions to new constituencies (Musgrave 
and Liou 2016), either to gain leverage against elite rivals 
(Waldner 1999) or to ward off political challenges observed 
in key reference countries (Koesel and Bunce 2013). 
Yet while resource wealth can make it easier for rulers to 
afford costly new policy overtures, resource windfalls alone 
are not enough for leaders to cultivate new bases of “active 
support.” With regards to Saudi Arabia, for example, 
prominent commentator Ali Shihabi once argued that a 
“passive majority” could not maintain the Al Saud family in 
power, advocating instead the active cultivation of support 
among the “sophisticated intellectual elite” by permitting 
greater media freedoms, while revitalizing the clerical elite 
“with younger and more charismatic individuals, such as 
Sheikh Salman al-Awdah.” (Shihabi 2016: 84-86, 148-152)1 
Others in this volume outline the ways in which states 
have deployed rentier wealth to court such support, via 
policies that go beyond simply cutting a check for society 
1   Shihabi now runs a pro-Saudi government think tank in Washington, D.C. Salman al-Awdah was arrested in 2017, joining a number of other liberal 
and Islamist reformers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia who have been arrested over the past year.
2   Data taken from “GCC: Percentage of nationals and non-nationals employed in GCC countries (2015),” Gulf Labor Markets, Migration and 
Population Programme, 2017, http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-percentage-nationals-non-nationals-employed-population-gcc-countries-2015/  
at large. State-funded programs to support women’s 
entrepreneurship, Crystal Ennis notes, court international 
approval and buy-in from some women – to varying degrees 
of success. Calvert Jones likewise notes the efforts of Gulf 
rulers to convert resource wealth into symbolic capital, 
such as social reforms by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad 
bin Salman that aim at building popular support while 
undermining the authority of conservative religious clerics. 
Justin Gengler and others in turn demonstrate that some 
policies’ symbolic (and hence political) importance to 
citizens outweighs their raw material value.
Saudi labor regulation and coalitional choices
In terms of labor policy, the monarchies of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) have long conceded efforts 
to nationalize private-sector workforces in the face of 
lobbying efforts by employers eager to prevent policy 
changes that would raise the cost of expatriate labor 
and cut into their profits. The resulting open migration 
policies, which cede considerable discretion to individual 
employers, have resulted in expats forming anywhere 
from 55% to 95% of these countries’ labor forces (GLMMP 
2017).2 Forceful action on nationalization might signal 
regimes’ concern with citizen unemployment and 
underemployment, yet would risk upsetting the seemingly 
sustainable status quo of shunting citizens into growing 
public-sector payrolls. 
In Saudi Arabia, however, the Ministry of Labor has 
aggressively pursued “Saudization” in recent years – 
even before oil prices fell sharply in 2014 (cf. Shin 2017). 
Reforms came despite the fact that direct government 
subsidies appeared to have immunized the country’s 
Sunni population from the Arab Spring uprisings without 
angering Saudi employers. Representative political 
institutions such as the Shura Council remained little more 
than window dressing, affording citizens little means to 
counteract private-sector lobbying as is the case in Kuwait 
(Herb 2014). What happened?
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Pre-2011: Roads not taken
Prior to 2011, workforce nationalization efforts dating 
back to the 1970s had come and gone to little effect in 
Saudi Arabia (Randeree 2012: 13). Hand-wringing about 
unemployment and “labor market imbalances” made a 
regular appearance in Saudi media during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, yet strategies for curbing the employment 
of foreign workers in favor of citizens frequently ran 
up against Saudi business lobbying. So “inexpensive” 
was imported labor that the expatriate population grew 
regardless of how the Saudi economy fared – employers 
could always find a way to turn a profit (Hertog 2012). 
Even as the Economic Development Board under Crown 
Prince Salman in neighboring Bahrain aggressively 
pursued coordinated action on labor-market and other 
economic reforms in the early 2000s, the Saudi Ministry 
of Labor struggled to maintain a coherent policy line on 
Saudization.
New regulations in Saudi Arabia were typically imposed 
by fiat, unevenly enforced, and suffered a slow death by 
a thousand cuts as private-sector interests leveraged 
personal ties to secure continued access to visas. As 
Steffen Hertog notes (2010: 191-203), technocrat Ghazi 
al-Gosaibi and other allies within the Ministry of Labor 
received royal backing from then-Crown Prince Abdullah 
to slow the number of new permits issued by 2005, only 
for the ongoing oil boom to strengthen the hand of the 
diffuse business community (Hertog 2010: 212-213). With 
representatives of the Council of Chambers and Industry 
lobbying (now King) Abdullah about the importance 
of migrant labor in fulfilling mounting state contracts 
quickly and cheaply, the King directed Gosaibi to quietly 
retreat from Saudization targets in sectors related to state 
development goals: education, healthcare, industry, and 
construction (Embassy Riyadh 2006). 
As reflected in Figure 2, Saudization of the private-sector 
workforce slowed accordingly. Saudization remained a 
stated priority but would not be pursued at the expense 
of aggregate economic growth (Embassy Riyadh 2009). 
Expatriate labor remained a more economical choice for 
3   Data taken from “Forty Seventh Annual Report,” Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 2011, pp. 206. 
private-sector employers, leading to a surprising number 
of layoffs of Saudi citizens in the wake of the global 
financial crisis and crashing oil prices over the course of 
2008 to 2009. The Ministry of Labor recorded a nearly 18% 
decrease in the number of Saudi citizens employed in the 
private sector across this time period, prompting Gosaibi 
to issue stern warnings of the Ministry’s willingness 
to “protect the interests of the national workforce” by 
sanctioning any employers using the financial crisis as a 
pretext to lay off Saudi citizens (“’al-‘aml’” 2009). While 
recruitment of foreign workers continued, barely 10 
percent of private-sector employees were Saudi citizens 
on the eve of the uprisings that rocked the Arab world 
beginning in late 2010.3 
Post-2011: Employment before profits
The uprisings of the Arab Spring changed perceptions 
among Saudi leadership that workforce nationalization 
could be put off indefinitely, prompting efforts to 
demonstrate a credible policy commitment to employing 
citizens. In contrast to the mass unrest of the 1994-1999 
Intifada that helped precipitate economic reforms in 
Bahrain, the 1990s and 2000s in Saudi Arabia saw few 
protests marked by socioeconomic grievances outside 
of Shia areas in the country’s Eastern Province (Menoret 
2016). Despite a small uptick in unemployment, driven 
largely by more Saudi women seeking to enter the 
workforce, the rate of Saudi job-seekers unable to find 
Figure 2: Composition of Saudi private sector by citizenship, 
2004-2014. Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
annual reports (2004-2014).
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employment was still below what it had been just a few 
years earlier (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Saudi unemployment rate by gender, 1999-2014. 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA).
In 2011, however, authorities feared that the region-
wide unrest of the Arab Uprisings might ignite latent 
grievances within the Kingdom as well. While online calls 
for demonstrations in Saudi Arabia never coalesced into a 
nation-wide movement, fears within the government were 
not easily dispelled. Official demands for quiescence were 
unequivocal: “The necessity of obedience in the land of 
Islam and the heartland of belief is not up for discussion,” 
underscored a Friday sermon following the GCC 
intervention in Bahrain (al-Tayyar 2011). While a “Day 
of Rage” in Riyadh planned for March 11 attracted only a 
single protestor, King Abdullah announced an incredible 
$97 billion in new jobs, welfare payments, and housing 
support the following week. Government spending 
trended sharply upwards in the years that followed as 
Saudi Arabia joined its peer GCC monarchies in expanding 
public-sector hiring and welfare payments to increasingly 
unsustainable levels (“Labor Market Reforms” 2013). 
Yet labor-market policy responses in Saudi Arabia went 
beyond mere handouts, driven by a perception that 
(particularly male) citizen unemployment was now a 
looming threat.4 “Saudi employment… had the priority back 
then because of the unrest in neighboring countries, so we 
had to come up with policies that would employ Saudis as 
4   Many Saudi officials are committed to expanding female citizens’ economic participation for reasons of productivity and gender equity. However, 
male unemployment has more commonly provoked concerns about political instability (Shihabi 2016: 63). 
5   Author interview. Former senior employee, Ministry of Economy and Planning, 19 January 2018. 
much as possible at that time,” noted one former official.5 
Additionally, these policies would be publicly announced 
and enforced – signaling to the Saudi population at large 
that the government would prioritize their employment over 
the profits of wealthy “captains of industry”.
In summer of 2011, Minister of Labor Adel Faqieh 
announced the new Nitaqat (“Ranges”) program for 
Saudization, calling workforce nationalization “a pressing 
national necessity rather than simply a choice” (Al Jabril 
2011). The program penalizes firms who fall short of 
sector-specific quotas that determine the acceptable ratio 
of citizen to non-citizen employees, denying them access 
to visas, government services, and public-sector contracts. 
As thousands of ordinary Saudi citizens began to draw 
salaries from the private sector, employers bore the costs 
of adjustment; numerous companies closed rather than 
meet Saudization requirements, while hiring of expatriates 
slowed (Peck 2017: 340-343).
Despite repeated suggestions by outside experts and the 
Kingdom’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry that 
structural factors limited the effectiveness of market-
wide Saudization by fiat, the kind of blanket concessions 
made under King Abdullah have not been forthcoming 
(REF 2013; Herb 2017). Interviews with a number of 
Riyadh-based private-sector employers, undertaken 
several years into implementation, give the impression 
of a Ministry (now the combined Ministry of Labor and 
Social Development) with expanded capacity to monitor 
and enforce quotas and with little “flexibility” in allowing 
firms to fall short of regulations. Even critical interviewees 
noted a marked advance in Ministry speed and efficiency 
over the preceding years, with greater automation and the 
expansion of e-government services. Specific violations 
of the program’s terms – such as fraudulent efforts to 
obtain Saudization “credit” by employing Saudi citizens 
with disabilities – are met with equally specific threats of 
administrative retaliation (Al-Misbahi 2017).  
Overall, despite minor concessions on the pace at which 
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Nitaqat ratchets up Saudization requirements, the 
government has maintained its all-encompassing focus 
on Saudization. Firms’ actions demonstrate costly efforts 
to comply with Saudization quotas, spending significant 
sums on hiring surplus Saudis regardless of qualifications 
or investing time and resources into constructing new 
pipelines of talented candidates. 
Conclusion
While studying the decision-making processes of autocrats 
is a challenging endeavor, particularly in the Middle 
East and North Africa, it is a necessary step if we are to 
understand how the pathologies of the rentier state might 
be contained. Consider the dramatic policy changes 
under Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, son of 
King Abdullah’s successor, who has shown far greater 
willingness to trade the support of long-standing regime 
allies in favor of mass appeals. Scores of erstwhile regime 
allies were imprisoned in the Ritz Carlton Hotel under his 
watch – with assets seized ultimately helping to pay for 
a new round of subsidies to citizens in the public sector 
(Reuters 2018).
Rentier theories have long assumed that politicians’ 
perceptions and expectations of politicians play a key role 
in connecting the raw realities of government revenue into 
political outcomes – the mere anticipation of an economic 
boom may be enough to bring about the various social 
and political ills associated with rentier wealth (Frynas, 
Wood, and Hinks 2017). If this is the case, however, it is 
fair to assume that expectations about the future course 
of global energy markets contend with (and are frequently 
subordinated to) more proximate political concerns. 
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Oil and societal quiescence: 
Rethinking causal mechanisms in rentier state theory
Jessie Moritz, Australian National University
Does the absence of revolution in the states of the Gulf 
during the 2011 Arab uprisings vindicate the argument 
that an oil or gas-rich government could ‘buy’ political 
loyalty by transferring vast sums of rent-derived material 
wealth to citizens?  Such claims on behalf of rentier state 
theory (RST) are common in both academic research and 
in the media coverage of the region after 2011. “A fresh 
infusion of money has so far bought order,” concluded the 
New York Times about Saudi Arabia in early 2011, while 
Michael Ross asked later that year whether oil would 
“drown” the Arab Spring, noting: “the Arab Spring has 
seriously threatened just one oil-funded ruler – Libya’s 
Muammar al-Qaddafi – and only because [NATO]’s 
intervention prevented the rebels’ certain defeat.”1 
Academic research too has occasionally relied on simplistic 
characterizations of the relationship between oil and 
societal quiescence, as in Samuel Huntington’s claim that 
“the lower the level of taxation, the less reason for the 
public to demand representation”.2
My research suggests that the link between rents, rent 
distributions, and co-optation is not nearly so settled.3 
This relationship is an important one to get right: 
without connecting oil and societal quiescence, it is 
difficult to identify the impact of oil on democratization 
or civil conflict, both of normative as well as theoretical 
importance to academic researchers and policymakers. 
That is, we must first understand how rents impact 
political mobilization before we can understand whether 
this will lead to violent conflict, regime change, or 
democratization.4 Given the often contradictory findings of 
research on rents and political outcomes, a reassessment of 
causal mechanisms is important, as is already happening in 
the related literature on natural resources and civil war.5  
In part, as Michael Herb has argued, the ambiguous 
political outcomes of rentierism are due to complex 
causality, which in turn complicates the search for law-like 
relationships between rents and political outcomes.6 He 
calls for the study of contextualized causal mechanisms 
through careful analysis of case studies, a suggestion 
reinforced here. However, even within case study research, 
political economy research in the archetypal rentier 
states of the Gulf has been heavily focused on top-down, 
state-centric processes of de-mobilization, pointing to 
the relative absence of street demonstrations or civil 
society associations as evidence of the state’s success. 
This ‘co-optation mechanism’ has become pervasive as an 
explanation for politics in petroleum-rich states, especially 
in the archetypal rentier states of the Gulf. 
Pro-government narratives, for example, expressed outrage 
when citizens challenged the state despite benefiting from 
the rentier system.  There was no Omani Spring, claimed 
Muscat Daily commentator Raya al-Kharusi in 2012, as: 
we have no such thing because the West’s reference 
to what happened in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, Syria and 
Jordan have [sic] no comparison to the very few misfits 
who are ungrateful for all that has been done for them 
– educationally, health, free plots of land at only One 
Rial Omani per square meter, overseas scholarships, 
overseas government paid medical treatment, and the 
list goes on.7 
In Bahrain, the Al-Rased television show questioned 
those who accepted state benefits and yet challenged the 
government; for example, an episode on 11 May 2011 
focused on doctors and medical staff from Bahrain’s public 
hospital.8 Also in Bahrain, incarcerated protesters reported 
their interrogators had expressed confusion over why 
medium and high-income Bahrainis risked their financial 
position to remain politically active. “They ask everybody 
about this…they aren’t thinking away from these material 
things”, claimed Mohammed al-Tajer, a Bahraini human 
rights lawyer who was detained in al-Qurain prison for 
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over two months in 2011. “They thought that people rise 
[sic] because they want their salary, they want to be better 
paid…they never thought that our revolution was because 
we want freedom, we want democracy, we want a kind of 
share…in managing the country.” But many policy-makers 
I interviewed in Bahrain and Oman did not consider a 
material response as sufficient to defuse societal unrest, 
so it is certainly not a universal attitude. Nor did many of 
the activists themselves, suggesting this is an important 
moment to rethink our understanding of the co-optation 
mechanism.
Testing the micro-foundations
In part, this is a call to move away from national or cross-
national levels of analyses, and towards sub-national or 
meso- (group) and micro- (individual) level studies – in 
essence, to re-evaluate the micro-foundations of the rentier 
state.  The literature has focused too much on how the 
state has attempted to produce societal quiescence and not 
enough on how and why members of society have chosen 
to promote, accept, or resist those attempts. Shifting the 
focus to society, of course, may uncover evidence that 
rent-based co-optation does work on some types of groups 
at certain times. If rentierism explains societal quiescence, 
in fact, then we should see evidence of its influence in the 
attitudes and actions of citizens (or at least a critical mass 
of citizens), especially in terms of determining whether or 
not to challenge state authority.
Nationally-representative surveys, though these are 
difficult to conduct in authoritarian contexts, may 
shed light on drivers of societal quiescence or citizen 
mobilization: one example is Justin Gengler’s 2009 
study of Bahraini citizens, which found that material 
satisfaction explained Sunni, but not necessarily Shia, 
political activism.9 Jim Krane’s study of GCC citizen versus 
expert perceptions of rentier entitlements, too, found 
that experts (including senior ministry officials in all six 
GCC states) overestimated citizen opposition to subsidy 
reform, suggesting that the state may have more room to 
manoeuvre on economic issues than they realize.10 
Such attempts to use different sources of evidence to 
reassess the rent-societal quiescence relationship, not 
only from the position of the state, but also from the 
perspective of citizens, are critical. For example, if rent 
distributions increased at the national level and protests 
faltered, this correlation between rents and societal 
quiescence could easily be taken as evidence of causation. 
However, is a causal relationship convincing based on 
data from the protesters themselves? Did individuals feel 
more economically satisfied following the distributions? 
Is this why they left the streets? Was repression involved? 
What about other drivers of attitudes or behavior? For 
instance, if a citizen is employed in the public sector and 
receives free healthcare, free education, and other material 
benefits from the state, then according to the co-optation 
mechanism they should be unlikely to mobilize politically. 
However, as I found in my research, many political activists 
who had received those benefits but still mobilized in 
2011 justified their action by reference to an ideology that 
encouraged challenges to state authority (for example 
Marxist-leftism, or religious groups who perceived a moral 
imperative to push for their beliefs). This suggests that 
the co-optation mechanism has either been ineffective 
or overpowered by these other drivers of political 
mobilization.11 
A dynamic approach to rents and society
Qualitative evidence suggests that these other drivers are 
important,12 yet the bulk of RST works remain fixed on 
state-centric, material-based explanations for political 
mobilization. Ironically, even Giacomo Luciani, one 
of the earliest architects of RST, specifically warned 
against promulgating theories of a ‘rentier state’ in 1987, 
arguing that in doing so there was “a distinct danger of 
exaggerating the argument and overlooking the fact that 
oil…is not the only significant dimension.”13
A better balance between society-centric and state-centric 
analyses would point towards the dynamic impact of 
rentierism. As rent distributions fluctuate, especially as the 
state attempts to curtail burdensome and unsustainable 
expenditures,14 how do these changes impact citizen 
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attitudes towards the state?15 Paying greater attention to 
societal activism at the sub-national level can highlight 
how citizens move between political quiescence, active 
opposition, and even active support of the state, as well as 
how they shift between different forms of political action 
– from street protests, to popular petitions, to expressions 
of reform desires on social and traditional media – in 
response to regime governance strategies. In doing so, 
we can more effectively analyze the absence of political 
mobilization, especially where the state has employed 
an innovative regime survival strategy.  Such approaches 
may move beyond rent distributions to the use of social 
engineering (as Calvert-Jones covers in this collection), 
state-sponsored feminism (see Ennis), or coalition-
shuffling (Leber), among other tactics.
In Qatar, where street protests did not occur in 2011, 
there have nonetheless been mobilizations on social 
media challenging key state directives (the sale of pork, 
for example, which is in turn linked to a perceived threat 
to culture driven by Qatar’s rapid, state-led economic 
development program). “The good thing about Twitter is 
there’s an avalanche factor,” argued a Qatari who’d been 
involved in several ‘hashtag movements’ for social change, 
“which means that nobody can be pinpointed – [it is] 
very difficult to determine who started the thing. It’s very 
difficult to determine if the person who started the thing 
actually wanted it to go to that direction, so it’s very safe 
to write in that sphere.” At the same time, direct calls for 
political liberalization in Qatar are very rare. A Qatari 
academic who otherwise expressed a desire for reform, 
when asked why there was no Arab Spring in Qatar, 
responded with the following:
You know that there’s no political representation. You 
know that incarceration could happen if you raise your 
voice too much and you’re living better than most 
people in the whole world…You’re not going to change 
the entire system; it’s not even conceivable, with that 
very few people [sic]. And the cost is very high because 
you’re going to move from being one of the richest 
people in the world to being incarcerated. So because 
of that steep cost, people just say: “what the hell.” 
Alone, this interviewee has raised at least three 
mechanisms which have prevented their personal political 
mobilization: the threat of repression by the state (and, 
as the interviewee later went on to highlight, also by 
regime loyalists); the perception that reform would be 
unsuccessful (lack of opportunity); and material benefits 
(rent-based co-optation). All of these could be, directly or 
indirectly, linked to rentierism. At the same time, the cost-
benefit analysis of political mobilization shifts considerably 
when these dynamics are altered, such as when state 
repression targets personal or kinship networks: one 
Bahraini participant in the 2011 protests, when asked 
why he had mobilized, said: “[w]hen you come from a 
Shia family, you have a family member in jail”, whereas 
another noted that her Aunt’s arrest had caused her to start 
publicly criticizing the state. The likelihood of these latter 
individuals becoming politically quiescent due to increased 
material distributions is low, illustrating the limits of the 
co-optation mechanism.16
Micro-level studies, of course, must be supported by data 
collected at the meso- and national level before patterns of 
political mobilization can be generalized. Nonetheless, they 
do offer an opportunity to identify a potential ‘universe’ 
of causal mechanisms relevant to societal quiescence in 
oil and gas-rich states, which, as Herb notes, may offer a 
productive way forward for a literature dealing with causal 
complexity.17 It may improve our understanding of co-
optation generally, too: after all, the co-optive capacity of 
rentier states differs largely in scale, rather than nature, to 
that of non-rentier states. Moreover, returning to careful 
analysis of causal mechanisms, alongside a better balance 
between state-centric and society-centric explanations 
for political mobilization, may help to generate new 
understandings of rents and societal quiescence, including 
those that can more effectively incorporate non-material 
as well as material explanations for political mobilization. 
These findings, most importantly, may help RST to remain 
relevant as an explanation of a particular type of social 
contract, with both theoretical and normative implications 
for oil and gas-rich states.
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What’s yours is mine: 
Gulf SWFs as a barometer of state-society relations 
Karen E. Young, American Enterprise Institute and George Washington University
Introduction
The concept of rentierism is deeply entangled with 
understandings of state formation and state-society 
relations in the Arab Gulf states. But it’s not just about 
oil; rentierism and late-rentierism are investigations 
about ownership, distribution of resources and sharing 
of everything from public employment to electricity 
to foreign investments. As Claire Beaugrand neatly 
unpacks, the idea of oil and of shared wealth is intrinsic 
to state identity, but also to the way that scholars have 
approached the region and their investigations of it. She 
explains that oil rentierism has morphed into a “theoretical 
metonym”, to use Appadurai’s term, which has dominated 
knowledge production of the region. What the concept 
has engendered is a preoccupation with wealth, with 
competition for resources, and with the idea of ownership. 
It should come as no surprise that this idea of ownership 
might be contested, especially in new times of changing 
understandings of what states can dedicate in their fiscal 
policy towards the public sector wage bill, mounting 
defense spending, regional aid and outwardly placed 
investment partnerships.  One way of rethinking this 
relationship is through the concept of the “citizen 
shareholder”, a term deployed by Beaugrand and Ennis 
to suggest how capitalism and its particular ethics of 
ownership connect to Gulf political economies. While 
Ennis problematizes the role that women play as agents 
of liberalization and entrepreneurship in the late-rentier 
model, both scholars show how the metonym of oil and its 
rents define identities of citizens and inform descriptions 
of the politics of these states.
This essay focuses on a distinctive site of these relations 
between rentier economies and citizen shareholders: 
1   Baldwin, D. (1985) Economic Statecraft. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
the sovereign wealth fund (SFW). SWFs are based upon 
the shared rents from oil (really any natural resource) 
production, but as they have evolved they are also 
becoming transformative in new national development 
strategies. These SWFs now veer from traditional practices 
of safe-guarding wealth to more experimental and high-
risk strategies that claim to be able to diversify national 
economies from oil dependency while also promising high 
returns. The moment of late-rentierism is now heightening 
questions of ownership, of the state’s role as guardian or 
steward of society’s wealth.
Society’s wealth managed by the state 
The purpose of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is like an 
inter-generational savings account, a collective nest-egg 
of society that is held and managed by the state. Not all 
sovereign funds are based on natural resource wealth, but 
in the Gulf states they are exclusively the product of oil and 
gas revenues. Foreign reserve assets, or traditional reserves 
in the Gulf, are also products of oil and gas sales abroad, 
but these funds may be managed more conservatively 
and are generally like cash savings, meant to stay liquid 
and easily transferred. Some sovereign wealth funds are 
focused on domestic investment, while most in the Gulf 
are meant to be deployed abroad in an effort to grow 
wealth, but more frequently also used to extend political 
reach. The deployment of SWFs as a tool of economic 
statecraft (using economic means to achieve foreign policy 
goals1) is not unique to the Gulf states, but the intensity of 
their use as political outreach, leverage, and increasingly in 
competition with each other is a regional trend.
Like the economic diversification efforts unfolding across 
the Gulf Cooperation Council states since late 2014 when 
oil revenues sharply declined, there is a growing diversity 
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in approach by governments in both how to spend more 
precious income from oil and how to deploy the wages 
of oil2 abroad. We now observe experimentation in fiscal 
policy across the Gulf, as governments make diverse 
decisions about where they can reduce spending on 
generous benefit programs and employment opportunities 
for citizens and how they might capture savings from their 
expatriate populations in the form of new taxes and fees or 
by simply excluding them from certain sectors of the labor 
force.3 This slimmer, meaner form of fiscal management 
has also meant a renewed focus on value for money in 
investments and aid abroad.4 
Sovereign wealth funds of the Gulf states are thus 
developing some distinctive characteristics, reflective 
of the “visions” of their leaders for national economic 
development. SWFs and their management can tell 
us about how leadership in these states prioritizes 
(or minimizes) local economic growth and domestic 
constituencies. They tell us how Gulf governments view 
international partnerships as targets of state investment 
initiatives. They tell us a lot about appetite for risk, not 
just in the language of investments, but in how leaders 
take liberties with the savings of their citizens. Even 
more broadly, the ideas of collective wealth embodied 
in the SWF can serve as a barometer of state-society 
relations, defined by how leaders and governments view 
their responsibility for caretaking and increasing national 
wealth. 
These choices also demonstrate how leadership perceives a 
time horizon for meeting development goals.  For example, 
prioritizing short-term goals of job creation for nationals 
2   I borrow the term “wages of oil” from: Michael Herb (2014) The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE. Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press. 
3   Young, K. (2018) “Experiments in fiscal governance: The economic reform agenda in the GCC,” Baker Institute, Rice University, September 2018. 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/confronting-governance-crisis-middle-east/ 
4   Young, K. (2017) “The New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: A Case Study of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt,” Journal of Arabian 
Studies,  7:1, 113-136, DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2017.1316051
5   https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-11/saudi-wealth-fund-is-said-to-prepare-to-sign-11-billion-loan
6   https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-10/citi-goldman-said-to-advise-on-mega-saudi-aramco-sabic-deal
7   https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/294681
8   https://www.tahawultech.com/cnme/news/bloomberg-softbank-seeking-kuwaiti-qatari-vision-cash/
by accelerating both domestic and outward-placed 
investments to acquire stakes in new firms that promise 
to provide local operations, including high tech-focused 
investments, invites a certain level of risk. A willingness 
to borrow signals a sovereign wealth fund is more of an 
active investment fund, or a hedge fund, rather than a safe 
deposit of shared wealth. In the latter, we see the emerging 
characteristics of the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, the 
Public Investment Fund (PIF). It is borrowing5, selling off 
existing stakes in state firms6, taking a short-term view of 
returns, and willing to engage in partnerships with foreign 
funds7. A higher risk tolerance in investments of a SWF 
can be an indication of the state’s perception of threats 
to its domestic legitimacy—perform and deliver now or 
risk unrest and an unsatisfied population at home. Those 
with longer-term horizons also include some institutional 
measure of accountability, through parliament or by 
law as in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti fund specifically declined 
opportunities to join UAE and Saudi partnerships with 
higher risk technology firms like Softbank.8 Mergers of 
investment funds also point to political consolidation 
within national systems, as we see in the federation of the 
UAE.
How they save, spend, and invest it: Diversity of SWF 
approaches in the Gulf states
Saudi Arabia
In Saudi Arabia, we have seen a recent radical shift in 
the government’s approach to sovereign wealth. The 
Vision 2030 diversification plan specifically tasks the 
Public Investment Fund with generating domestic growth 
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and employment opportunity, as well as increasing 
partnerships with international investment funds.9 
Historically, Saudi Arabia did not see it appropriate to set 
up an outwardly-focused investment fund of its national oil 
revenues.  The Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA) 
is a central bank and has had responsibility for foreign 
reserve assets of the government. It was only in the recent 
upturn in global oil prices between 2003 and 2014 that 
Saudi Arabia began to amass such high reserves in foreign 
currency. Most of Saudi investment in this period was very 
safe, low risk in foreign currency accounts abroad and in 
the purchase of other governments’ debt, specifically large 
holdings of US Treasury bonds. The earliest externally 
focused sovereign wealth fund in Saudi Arabia was 
established in 2008, the Sanabil Al Saudia, with just $5.3 
billion in assets.10 
The Public Investment Fund (PIF) was founded by royal 
decree in 1971 with a focus on domestic investment. The 
PIF has been a part-owner of some domestic industry, 
including the petrochemical giant SABIC, which the PIF 
now intends to sell to another government entity, Aramco, 
the national oil company. The PIF is both a source of 
capital and a new destination for government funds. Its 
new role in Saudi political economy is unprecedented. It 
is the central engine of growth in the new Saudi Arabia, 
as envisioned by the new Crown Prince Mohamed bin 
Salman. State resources are directed to feed the PIF, and 
state assets are being sold to raise cash for the PIF.11 At 
the same time, money is moved from foreign reserve 
assets to the PIF in order to be placed abroad in new 
kinds of investment opportunities outside of the norm of 
Saudi investment history. The new investments are not in 
long-term, low-yield US Treasuries, but rather more risky 
investments in technology firms like Uber, entertainment 
companies, and massive real estate projects or “giga-
projects” as they are called in the Vision 2030 National 
9   http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/pifprogram/about 
10   Bahgat, G. (2017) “Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Persian Gulf States,” Oxford Handbook of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 595-617.
11    Young, K. (2018) “Spending to Grow,” Market Watch, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 10 August 2018. https://agsiw.org/spending-grow-
saudi-arabia/ 
12   https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/Pages/vrp.aspx 
Visualization Programs. Perhaps most importantly, the PIF 
is now a strategic partner with private investment funds 
like the Softbank fund, which is responsible not to citizens, 
but to shareholders or fund partners. 
The shift in Saudi Arabia from conservative SAMA to the 
new PIF is a repurposing of existing institutions to create 
a system of state institutions within the state. This is the 
Crown Prince’s parallel Saudi state, with its own agenda for 
economic growth and a very strong hand against internal 
dissent or alternative ideas about the appropriate role 
of private enterprise in the service of the state, or ideas 
about the state in the economy. The other characteristic 
of the new PIF is its accelerated pace of investments and 
expansion of the institution itself.12 The horizon for growth 
is short. The imperative is to demonstrate quick returns 
and opportunities for citizens now. The long-term growth 
horizon is hazy. If a technology firm wants PIF investment 
and agrees to start operations inside the kingdom in the 
next year, the payout can be huge for the firms. 
For the citizens of Saudi Arabia, the benefits are meant 
to satiate immediate needs for job growth and to show 
demonstrable signs of diversification. This means new 
entertainment venues, theme parks, and the infrastructure 
of a changed society and service economy. Whether or 
not these investments provide long-term productivity 
growth or steady returns on investment become secondary 
priorities. Because the Crown Prince is concerned with 
a young constituency, his directives to the PIF are largely 
short-term in scope and equally high-risk. He wants results 
(and returns) now, though what will be left of the PIF in 
twenty or thirty years is less of a public policy priority.
United Arab Emirates
In the UAE, there has been a recent consolidation of 
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investment operations of multiple sovereign wealth funds. 
As the UAE is a federation, there are funds owned and 
operated by individual emirates and their ruling families, 
and inside of Abu Dhabi’s government there are also 
multiple funds. The question of how sovereign wealth is 
shared and transferred to citizens is complicated in the 
UAE by the transfer of wealth within the federation. The 
fiscal policy of the UAE remains dependent on transfers 
from wealth based in Abu Dhabi to the other six emirates. 
These transfers are not clearly codified in constitutional 
law, such that there is tremendous latitude in what Abu 
Dhabi may or may not decide to share with the federal 
government.13  For example, the Investment Corporation 
of Dubai is an investment fund of the ruler of Dubai and 
contributes to the revenue of the emirate of Dubai, which 
makes some contribution to the federal budget. Revenue 
sources from the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company go to 
the emirate of Abu Dhabi and are then dedicated in part 
to the federal government. Funds from oil revenues also 
go to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the largest 
outwardly-focused investment vehicle of the emirate. 
Smaller funds in Abu Dhabi include the Mubadala fund, 
which was created to focus on domestic technology 
innovation and investment, and the International 
Petroleum Investment Corporation (IPIC) with an outward 
focus. In June 2016, a merger was announced between 
Mubadala and IPIC, which was finalized in January 2017.14 
The merger was a result of financial consolidation in the 
emirate of Abu Dhabi in the era of reduced oil revenue 
and as a realization that the new investment funds were 
not delivering the returns for which the government had 
hoped. Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC) formed in 
2007 as an investment arm of the emirate with a focus on 
domestic firms, mostly in the finance sector. The Emirates 
Investment Authority is the only federal SWF, but it is also 
one of the smallest in assets. Created by federal decree in 
2007, it invests both domestically and internationally, with 
significant stakes in the national telecom sector. 
13   Young, K. (2017) “UAE Fiscal Policy: Shining Light on Federal Resource Sharing,” Market Watch, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 20 
October 2017. https://agsiw.org/uae-fiscal-policy-shining-light-federal-resource-sharing/
14   https://www.mubadala.com/en/ipic-mubadala-merger 
The overall SWF strategy in the UAE is divided between 
diversification efforts domestically, with a strong focus 
on technology and renewable energy innovation via 
Mubadala, and a quiet and traditional portfolio investment 
approach by ADIA. Much of ADIA’s outward investment 
is managed by other funds, many based in the US or UK. 
This is a an out-sourcing of public savings and resources, 
characterized by a very low profile within the country. 
Earnings are not public; holdings are not disclosed. 
The UAE’s design of wealth management is like a 
federation. The largest assets are held and managed by 
Abu Dhabi and its ruling family, but the assumption is 
the wealth is to provide services for all citizens of the 
UAE. As this wealth expanded substantially from 2007 
(when many of the funds formed) to 2014, there are 
now choices about how to better merge funds and direct 
investment internally. There has always been competition 
between emirates, and SWFs are likely to share part of 
that ethic, especially as state-owned entities like telecoms, 
utilities and aluminum smelters are now considered for 
privatization. These firms are all partially held by state (or 
emirate) investment entities, but their sales are meant to 
provide revenue for the citizen population and its federal 
authority at large. The overall consolidation of investment 
vehicles in Abu Dhabi also relates to a consolidation within 
the ruling family and the identification of stewards of 
wealth, as well as rising stars within the emirate’s power 
structure under the crown prince Mohamed bin Zayed. 
The appointment to management of these funds is also a 
sign of patronage.
Kuwait
Kuwait and its massive SWF the Kuwait Investment 
Authority have a premier status in the investment world. 
Founded in 1953, it is the oldest SWF in the world. Known 
for its conservative management and consistent returns, 
Kuwait’s strategy has always been focused on outwardly 
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placed investment and never really bothered with domestic 
development or diversification goals. The idea is to export 
capital and have it return in multiples, mostly to be saved. 
In 1986, KIA revenues were more than oil revenues.15 
The Kuwaiti strategy has the advantage of accountability. 
10 percent of national oil revenues are committed to the 
fund each year by law. Kuwait’s parliament has the ability 
to question ministers, including the head of the KIA, in 
its debate sessions. According to recent reporting by the 
Financial Times, the Kuwaiti investment strategy continues 
to be international but has made a recent pivot to Asia.16 
China and other Asian states are the prime customers of 
Kuwait’s oil exports, so the investment linkages reflect a 
broader integration of economic and political interests.
Oman
Oman does not have the wealth of its neighbors. Since 
2014 its reserves have suffered and it has relied on 
extensive external finance to fund its fiscal budget. The 
Oman State General Reserve Fund is essentially a foreign 
15   Bahgat (2017), p. 610.
16   https://www.ft.com/content/e6fdc262-4e36-11e8-ac41-759eee1efb74
17   http://www.oman.om/wps/portal/index/interact/tanfeedh
reserve fund established in 1980, but there are newer 
funds like the Oman Investment Fund of 2006 and the 
Tanfeedh program (which is a national development fund, 
not a sovereign wealth fund)17 that are designed to fund 
and encourage domestic investment that serves the goal 
of economic diversification away from oil dependency. 
Many of the investments have been in tourism, ports, and 
fisheries, and one of the key tourism partners has been 
the Omani military pension fund. The outcome is that 
many key non-oil sectors remain strongly in the hands of 
government ownership and frequently under the indirect 
control of the military. 
The government is under significant pressure to 
demonstrate it can create jobs for nationals and that 
it can diversify its economic activity away from oil 
production. The Omani government follows a five-year 
development strategy and has been engaged in its own 
“national transformation” for economic diversification, 
with changes to managerial practice within ministries, 
including meeting key performance indicator targets 
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within the Tanfeedh program.18 Combining government 
investment funds and streamlining the multiple ministerial 
stakeholders in local development projects has meant 
disrupting inefficient management and integrating parallel 
investment silos across ministries. 
There are new efforts to streamline these various funds, 
specifically the Reserve Fund and Oman Investment 
Fund along the model achieved by Mubadala and IPIC in 
the UAE.19 For Oman, this would help combine tourism 
investments so that outside partners might help shoulder 
some of the cost (and reap the benefit) of domestic 
economic development plans, as in the Omran fund.20 
The general trend is a gradual opening to partnerships 
in domestic investment funds and some consolidation 
under more technocratic management with a vision to 
the necessary political and economic changes ahead. 
Oman’s first leadership transition in more than 40 years 
seems imminent, and the restructuring of its sovereign 
wealth funds reflects some of the bureaucratic preparation 
underway.
Bahrain
In Bahrain, oil reserves are scarce; surplus foreign 
reserves and capital to invest abroad are just as dear.  
The Mumtalakat is the Bahraini sovereign wealth 
fund established recently in 2006 by royal decree as an 
independent holding company for the government’s 
commercial assets. The fund does not receive oil revenues 
from the state, but rather is a mechanism to invest the 
earnings of other government entities. The government 
transferred ownership stakes in a number of public entities 
to start the fund on the model of a holding company. The 
fund is a shareholder in a number of government-related 
18   https://om.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/155/2017/02/Tanfeedh-10-Jan-17.pdf
19   https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-24/oman-said-to-follow-abu-dhabi-with-sovereign-fund-merger-plans
20   Young, K. (2018) “Slow and Go: Oman’s Investment and Reform Strategy,” Market Watch, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 25 January 2018. 
https://agsiw.org/omans-investment-and-reform-strategy-slow-and-go/
21   http://www.mumtalakat.bh
22   https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-rosneft-holding-qia/qatar-glencore-venture-values-its-rosneft-stake-at-7-4-billion-euros-idUKKBN1L01WY
23   https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/world/europe/turkey-andrew-brunson-tariffs.html 
entities, like Gulf Air, Aluminum Bahrain, National Bank 
of Bahrain, and Batelco.21 Bahrain will likely sell off some 
of these entities in the future. The role of the SWF will 
be important as the government faces some difficult 
choices in cost-savings. The model of the Mumtalakat 
is representative of Bahrain’s highly leveraged situation, 
squeezing the most out of every resource. 
Qatar
In Qatar, the power to spend is the power to extend 
influence, to gain state recognition and international 
legitimacy. Founded in 2005, the Qatar Investment 
Authority serves to place surplus oil and gas revenue 
abroad to increase returns. QIA has invested far and wide, 
from equities to real estate and high-profile acquisitions 
in Western commercial brands, banks, and corporations. 
For many years, the fund was closely associated with 
the former prime minister Hamad bin Jassim al Thani 
(HBJ) and his deal-making was both prolific and brash. 
More recently, Qatar has used its purse power to seal 
political alliances, from Turkey to Russia.22 The demand 
for immediate return on investment is not dire, as Qatar 
does not face the fiscal constraints of its neighbors. For 
that reason, many of its investments seem more glamour- 
and identity-driven than earnings-driven. More recently, 
Qatar has made investment commitments that are clearly 
for political motivation, e.g. in Turkey.23 The deployment 
of wealth by the state serves multiple purposes. Since 
June 2017 with the embargo of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, the rising tide of patriotism and 
nationalism has inoculated against any public resentment 
for bad investment decisions made in the name of political 
solidarity. 
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Conclusions
Comparing different investment strategies of 
Gulf sovereign wealth funds reveals some simple 
understandings of how states see their responsibility to 
shared wealth and how shifts in the management and 
organization of these funds reflects some institutional 
changes underway within the GCC states. Oil wealth, or its 
expected promise, is not the only source of state legitimacy 
in the Gulf, but it has been important in state formation 
and in the maintenance of state-society relations. Since 
late 2014, a period of economic reform has shifted some 
expectations of state provision of benefits and resources. 
Yet, the role of sovereign wealth funds has been slower 
to change, perhaps with the exception of the Saudi case 
in which the PIF is front and center of the diversification 
efforts. The efforts to reform the rentier structure of 
Gulf economies, including reduced subsidies of energy, 
openings to foreign ownership of firms, and relaxed visa 
restrictions on long-term residency all indicate the state’s 
interest in diminishing citizen shareholding in public 
resources.24 Conversely, citizens are more responsible for 
creating their own sources of wealth and social service 
provisions. SWFs are also under pressure to deliver higher 
returns, but often in more centralized development 
paradigms. Variation in how rulers leverage SWFs to 
broader diversification and development strategies tells 
us a lot about the immediacy of their reform agenda. 
How a state manages its nest egg may be an important 
indication of how it measures accountability to citizens 
and its willingness to gamble future savings for immediate 
demands to govern, provide, and maintain regime stability.
24   Karen E. Young (2018) “The Difficult Promise of Economic Reform,” Baker Institute https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/a9b497ad/cme-
pub-carnegie-young-092618.pdf
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Understanding Gulf citizen preferences towards rentier subsidies
Justin Gengler, Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University; Michael Ewers, SESRI, Qatar 
University; and Bethany Shockley, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath
The oil crash of 2014 spurred plans for lasting changes 
to the Gulf rentier economies.  Headlined by Saudi 
Arabia’s sweeping National Transformation Program, 
governments across the region have sought alternative 
revenue sources to maintain spending and fund ambitious 
development strategies.1  To this end, new policy tools are 
being implemented, including a value added tax, fees for 
once-free government services, and reductions in water, 
electricity, fuel, and food subsidies (see Krane and Leber 
in this collection). But reforms aimed at deficit reduction 
pose serious challenges for authoritarian states2 whose 
citizens are accustomed to generous welfare spending 
and subsidies as part of the so-called “rentier bargain” of 
financial patronage in return for political allegiance.3
As other contributions in this volume describe, modern 
revisions to classical rentier state theory have mostly 
dispelled the notion of rentier citizens as politically passive 
rent-seekers.4  (See Moritz and Jones in this collection.) 
However, a scarcity of reliable survey data from the 
Middle East and North Africa region generally,5 and from 
the oil-rich Gulf states in particular,6 means that we still 
know very little about how citizens view the structural 
economic changes being implemented in their countries, 
and whether and in what ways public opinion might serve 
to constrain or facilitate development toward a post-oil 
society.  What limited survey data do exist7 are restricted 
to specific fiscal policy measures, rely on direct survey 
questions that may be susceptible to measurement error, 
and sometimes are not based on representative samples. 
In some economic surveys, nationals and expatriates are 
aggregated in a way that obfuscates the behaviors and 
preferences of citizens.8 Thus, important questions remain.  
How does the average national in the Gulf think about the 
restructuring of their society?  And, more significantly, in 
what ways will public opinion facilitate or accommodate 
these changes spearheaded by decisionmakers? 
Public opinion and Gulf fiscal reform  
This paper examines how ordinary citizens of resource-
dependent Gulf states view and prioritize the different 
economic benefits to which they are entitled as citizens, 
including freedom from taxation, against the backdrop 
of post-2014 fiscal reform.  To this end, our study utilizes 
a rare survey of Qatari citizens conducted in 2016 by the 
Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at 
Qatar University.  The survey was conducted by telephone 
using a comprehensive national frame with coverage of 
approximately 95 percent of adult nationals.  The survey 
was implemented at a time when oil prices hit their lowest 
point in a decade at around $27 US dollars per barrel.  The 
steep decline precipitated Qatar’s first budget deficit in 
almost 15 years and, thereafter, the introduction of various 
cost-saving measures aimed at reducing the shortfall.9  
Thus, the survey timing made questions about fiscal 
austerity highly salient for our survey respondents.  
Qatar’s vast natural gas resources and citizenry of only 
around 300,000 individuals10 afford it unparalleled capacity 
for financial patronage.  Indeed, in 2014 its annual oil and 
gas rents amounted to more than $425,000 per citizen.11  
Qatar’s unelected leadership distributes a generous portion 
of this income to citizens via an extensive system of welfare 
benefits, comprising land allotments, marriage allowances, 
free water and electricity, free education and medical care, 
tax-free salaries, and near-guaranteed employment in the 
public sector,12 where 85 percent of working citizens are 
employed.13  Its “extreme”14 (or “über”15or “ultra-”16) rentier 
status makes Qatar an instructive case through which to 
study the character and drivers of public attitudes toward 
economic reform of the rentier state.
Rather than the exception, however, the case of Qatar is 
especially meaningful as an exemplar for the rest of the 
Gulf countries. As the recipients of the most generous 
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welfare regime in the Gulf, Qatari perceptions about 
changes to wealth distribution should be relatively muted 
compared with Saudi Arabia or Oman, for instance, 
where a small increase in food or energy costs can have a 
substantial impact on a family’s living expenses. The Qatar 
case raises different question from the relatively poorer 
Gulf states, namely: are people’s views of things different 
when expectations are higher?
Studying citizen preferences through surveys and 
survey experiments
Our survey examines how Qatari nationals view and 
prioritize the various financial benefits they receive by 
virtue of being citizens of a wealthy rentier state.  Such 
entitlements including free public services, direct cash 
transfers, and exemption from taxation.  A sustained 
period of low oil prices would necessitate cuts in benefits, 
but which entitlements do citizens consider essential to 
the rentier arrangement, and which are deemed relatively 
more negotiable? Rather than relying on traditional 
straightforward survey questions, we assess preferences 
via a novel survey experiment that presents subjects with 
a choice between competing economic alternatives.  Our 
experiment prompts Qatari respondents to think about 
the budget deficit facing the country and then asks them 
to identify which welfare subsidies they would prioritize in 
the event of a reduction in state spending.  
The experiment presents subjects with a choice between 
randomized sets, or “baskets,” of public goods (that is, 
a specific type of spending or subsidy), and they are 
asked to give priority to one basket over the other.  We 
then calculate the change in probability that a basket is 
selected when it includes a given good.  This procedure 
gives a straightforward ordering of citizen preferences.  In 
addition, by forcing subjects to select between competing 
material interests, the experiment mirrors the real-life 
tradeoffs that citizens must make amid a retrenchment 
of the rentier state.  A final benefit of the experimental 
design is that it allows citizens to reject or accept certain 
goods indirectly without revealing their preferences to the 
survey enumerator, mitigating measurement error due to 
social desirability bias.17  To illustrate these benefits, in the 
paper’s final section we compare our experimental findings 
to the answers to traditional survey questions that ask 
citizens directly about their subsidy preferences.
Experimental findings
The survey data reveal several important findings.  First, 
the experiment demonstrates that Qataris perceive some 
rentier entitlements as being significantly more essential 
than others: namely, universal social benefits such as free 
education, healthcare, water, and electricity.  Conversely, 
more individualistic or targeted subsidies, including 
direct cash allowances and even financially lucrative land 
allotments and government employment, are rated by 
citizens as being less essential benefits in comparative 
terms.  Citizens in Qatar are therefore seen to prioritize 
universal subsidies in the form of basic public services, 
over subsidies that accrue on an individual basis, despite 
the fact that some of the latter are more valuable in 
absolute financial terms.  We take this as evidence that 
Qataris tend to prefer economic subsidies in proportion 
to their expected likelihood of benefiting from them.  
Since access to free schools, healthcare, and utilities is 
nonexcludable, citizens can be confident of their eligibility. 
However, individualistic benefits such as housing and 
public sector jobs are mediated by more opaque processes 
of distribution and eligibility requirements, both formal 
and informal, which render them more excludable.
Another notable result from the experiment is that 
Qataris are less concerned about the possibility of paying 
taxes to the government than about potentially losing 
access to benefits they already enjoy.  That is, citizens 
view the loss of existing subsidies as more problematic 
than the introduction of new taxes, regardless of the 
potential financial implications.  Adding taxes could be 
relatively more costly over a lifetime than reducing cash 
allowances, for example, but also the simple five percent 
VAT introduced this year in some GCC countries could 
reflect the first step of government encroachment into a 
much broader income and sales tax regime. This result 
is consistent with principles derived from behavioral 
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economics, discussed elsewhere in this collection,18 which 
predict that uncertainty over the consequences of new 
policies may cause individuals to prefer a suboptimal status 
quo.  It may also be the case that citizens in Qatar simply 
lack knowledge about the practical financial implications 
of taxes, whereas the impact of retrenchment of other 
subsidies can be more easily perceived.  
Nonetheless, this result of the experiment is significant 
in light of the central place of taxation—or rather the 
lack thereof—in theorizing about the rentier state.  The 
ability of rent-based economies to support citizens 
without extracting from them has long been posited as a 
fundamental aspect of rentier political economy, and one 
which, if violated, is expected to undermine an essential 
pillar of state stability in autocratic rent-dependent 
regimes.19  Yet our results suggest, at a minimum, that 
there is no automatic rejection of taxation among 
rentier citizens in line with the reverse principle of “no 
representation, so no taxation,”20 as introduced in the 
earliest statements of the rentier state paradigm.  This 
finding about the surprising acceptability of taxation 
among Qataris accords with Krane’s 2015 survey-based 
conclusion, that Gulf citizens view welfare subsidies as 
“customary privileges” rather than the political “rights” 
assumed by rentier theorists.21
Thus, for Qataris and potentially other citizens of the 
Gulf, not cutting current benefits is more important than 
adding new expenses, even though the final cost to the 
individual citizen may be the same.  This demonstrates the 
importance of keeping up the appearance of state largesse 
even if some subsidies are ultimately transferred back to 
governments via taxes.  More generally, the results of the 
experiment would seem to confirm predictions made by 
international economic institutions, that if Gulf tax rates 
are kept low and implemented correctly, the majority of 
citizens should not feel a drastic impact, thus precluding 
social disturbances or hindering investment and economic 
growth opportunities.22  In the extreme rentier case of 
Qatar, at least, freedom from taxation does not seem to be 
an inviolable component of the rentier social contract.
The need for new approaches
Beyond its substantive insights into public attitudes 
toward economic change in the Gulf states, our study 
also makes a substantial methodological contribution, 
demonstrating the effectiveness—and arguably the 
necessity—of experimental-based approaches to studying 
citizen preferences on complex and/or controversial 
topics in social science.  This contribution can be 
observed by comparing our experimental findings to 
responses to corresponding direct survey questions.  
Whereas the survey experiment forces individuals to 
make a difficult choice between competing economic 
priorities, traditional survey questions demand no such 
compromise.  In addition, because straightforward 
questions require direct responses, respondents cannot 
avoid revealing their preferences to the survey enumerator 
and thus may face incentives to conform to socially and 
politically acceptable opinions.  Such social desirability 
bias may result, for example, if survey respondents view 
qualities like liberal-mindedness and lack of attachment 
to economic welfare as being more acceptable than 
resistance to change and financial dependence.  Citizens 
also may be reluctant to express opinions that could be 
perceived as criticisms of state policy, especially in settings, 
such as Saudi Arabia, where reform agendas are closely 
associated with ruling elites and where political dissent 
is not only socially unacceptable but criminalized.  By 
contrast, our experiment measures preferences indirectly, 
mitigating social desirability pressures. The choice 
experiment we employ has the added benefit of forcing 
respondents to designate some combinations of subsidies 
as more important than others. Compared to traditional 
question, this design better reflects the reality of benefit 
retrenchment by not allowing rentier citizens to have it 
all, as has perhaps been their custom. The result is that 
the experimental findings provide a meaningful ordering 
of preferences, which as we demonstrate below is not 
necessarily the case when direct questions are used instead. 
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Figure 1. The mean importance of different rentier subsidies 
in Qatar 
Consider, for instance, Figure 1.  It reports the average 
level of importance attached to each of the eight rentier 
subsidies included in the experiment when respondents 
are asked directly to rate them on a scale from 0 (“not 
essential”) to 10 (“absolutely essential”).  The question 
reads, 
Many things are desirable, but not all of them are 
essential characteristics of an oil rich Gulf state such 
as Qatar.  Please tell me for each of the following 
things how essential you think it is as a characteristic 
of a state like Qatar.  Use this scale, where 0 means 
“not at all an essential characteristic” and 10 means it 
definitely is “an essential characteristic”.
As is plain from a visual inspection of the figure, when 
asked directly Qataris tend to report that all benefits are 
essential to upholding the rentier bargain, with almost 
no statistically significant variation across individual 
items.  Apart from exemption from taxation, which has 
a mean importance rating of 7.5, all items fall within a 
narrow range from between 8.4 and 9.7.  As such, the 
main conclusion that one can draw from Figure 1 is that 
no conclusions can be drawn at all: when the question is 
posed directly to survey respondents, no rentier benefit 
is deemed significantly more important to Qataris than 
any other, with the exception of no taxes.  To understand 
how Qataris and other rentier citizens think about the 
economic tradeoffs they have been asked to make since 
2014, one needs a method that reflects the real-world 
choices they face.
Summary and implications
The contributions in this volume examine the evolving 
nature of the rentier state.  In so doing, they also highlight 
changing theoretical assumptions about state-society 
relations in resource-dependent economies such as 
describes the Arab Gulf countries and much of the broader 
Middle East and North Africa.  Many of these conceptual 
revisions serve to refocus examination away from the 
macro effects of oil and gas dependence and toward the 
individual-level mechanisms that are theorized to link rent 
distribution to social and political outcomes of interest.  
In some or even many cases, better understanding of the 
drivers of social and political behavior in rentier states 
has served to complicate rather than confirm hypotheses 
established in the literature.  Such is the case with the 
present study, which finds no visceral reaction against the 
prospect of taxation among citizens of Qatar, widely cited 
as the purest case of rentierism in the world today.
In this task of interrogating the behavioral assumptions of 
rentier state theory, survey research has an important role 
to play, alongside other methods designed to probe the 
opinions and preferences of ordinary citizens.  Yet opinion 
studies, not least those conducted in the Middle East 
region, must take care to account for known sources of 
bias that may produce misleading or ambiguous results.23  
The findings reported in this research note demonstrate 
the promise of experimental approaches to gauging 
citizen attitudes on complex and sensitive questions.  By 
measuring preferences indirectly and approximating real-
world processes of decision-making, survey-based choice 
experiments can avoid the social and political desirability 
bias inherent in more direct solicitations of opinion, while 
also eliciting more meaningful responses.  
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Oil metonym, citizens’ entitlement, and rent maximizing:  
Reflections on the specificity of Kuwait 
Claire Beaugrand, University of Exeter
According to the rentier-state theory (RST), the 
“externally-derived, usually unproductively-earned income 
resulting from natural resources or other natural or innate 
assets of an economy or of a state’s position or territory” 
impacts the state-society relationship in a way that makes 
the state less sensitive to society’s pressure.1 Expressions 
such as “buying off political acquiescence” have been 
commonly used to describe the autonomization of the 
ruling sphere from the ruled society and the process of 
authoritarian resilience. Scholars have early on contested 
this supposed political inertia: in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
Gwenn Okruhlik2 shows that the allocation of the rent or 
state expenses is eminently political and reacts to pressures 
from different parts of the society. Kuwait provides 
another example where state resources allocation has been 
carefully designed to respond to, or prevent and pre-empt, 
citizens’ grievances. Far from resulting in political apathy, 
rentierism has led to citizens putting strong demands on 
the state. I argue that the reason why nationals lay claim 
to the state resources is to be found in their feeling of 
entitlement, depending on each national situation. 
Feeling of entitlement or belief in the validity of one’s 
claim was indeed at the heart of my analysis of the 
puzzling presence of biduns in Kuwait3: the biduns are 
quintessentially distinct from any overstaying foreigners, 
because the latter would hardly think of claiming 
entitlement to Kuwaiti nationality. The exclusionary 
1   Gray, Matthew “Theorising politics, patronage and corruption in the Arab monarchies of the Gulf” in Laura Ruiz de Elvira, Christoph Schwartz, Irene 
Weippert-Fenner Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa, Routledge, 2018. P.54
2   “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States”, Comparative Politics 31, 3 April 1999: 295-315
3   Stateless in the Gulf : Migration, Nationality and Society in Kuwait, London : IB Tauris, 2018.
4   The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
5   Mahdavy, Hossein “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in a Rentier Stare: The Case of Iran” In M. A. Cook (Ed.), Studies in 
Economic History of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
6   Beblawi, Hazem and Giacomo, Luciani The Rentier State, London/New York, Croom Helm, 1987.
7   Gray, Matthew “A theory of late rentierism in the Arab States of the Gulf” Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University, 2011. 
The buzz word of post-rentierism is yet the latest version of the evolution of RST. 
8   “Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 28, No2 (April 1986) 356-361.p.357. 
citizenship law and the sponsorship or kafala system 
have both disciplined migrants into believing themselves 
to be temporary populations—despite the fact that 
this temporariness is historically a myth. Likewise, the 
feeling of entitlement is key to understand the dynamics 
of rentierism among nationals. How is it constructed in 
different polities? I argue, following analytical lines laid by 
Michael Herb,4 that the particular historical path followed 
by Kuwait led to a discursive construction and perception 
of the rent characterised by a strong feeling of citizens’ 
ownership of the rent, be it oil or the revenues derived from 
it. Secondly, against the background of a small and non-
extendable polity, different segments of the population lay 
claims to the state in continuous competition with each 
other. 
Discursive construction and perception of the rent
Since it was first formulated in 19705 but most importantly 
fully theorised and made popular in 19876, the RST has 
proved the overarching analytical framework for what 
became known as Gulf Studies. While refined, adapted, 
and updated7, the important thing is that its overall 
validity and prevalence has never really discarded until 
now—when the theoretical debate has shifted towards the 
“post-rentier” phase. From an epistemological point of 
view, oil rentierism in Gulf studies has morphed into what 
Appadurai8 calls a “theoretical metonym”, encapsulating 
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the quintessential and dominant question of interest in 
the region. The knowledge production of the Gulf region 
has been dominated by this metonym.9 This metonym has 
been fundamental in shaping the projected identity of the 
region from outside but also essential in the process of self-
identification.10
Oil is not only a world-traded, strategic commodity; it 
is also a perception. For the Marxist political economist 
Adam Hanieh in Capitalism and Class in the Arab Gulf 
States, oil is a “commodity embedded in a set of (globally 
determined) social relations.” Oil is endowed with a 
particular meaning conferred by the capitalist world 
market as a commodity centrally located within the 
reproduction of the system as a whole. Hanieh further 
quotes Marx who “warned of “commodity fetishism”—an 
attempt to explain patterns of social development through 
the presence or absence of a commodity rather than 
understanding the significance given to the commodity 
by the social relations within which it is situated.”11 For 
anthropologists equally, oil is a perception. As noted 
by Mandana Limbert in the case of Oman, “oil means 
something to people: the understanding people have of 
its presence shape the way people act in the world.” 12 It 
does so, more emblematically than any other “natural 
or innate asset” or “state-position in a territory”, like the 
revenues drawn from the Suez Canal’s crossing by the 
Egyptian government, or even more than in the case of aid 
recipient states that, it is argued, also can qualify as rentier 
economies for deriving the majority of their revenues 
from external unproductive sources, like Jordan. The 
rent, in those cases, seems more detached from people’s 
imaginaries and world of representations. Differences 
9   The 1986 book title of Muhammad Al-Rumaihi Beyond Oil: Unity and Development in the Gulf is somehow emblematic of the tendency that made the 
Gulf the showcase of the specific issue of oil-rent development. 
10   See, by way of example, the recent theatre play by British-Kuwaiti writer, Sulayman Al Bassam, whose setting and main plot evolves around a petrol 
station :  Petrol Station, London : Oberon Books, 2017
11   Capitalism and Class in the Arab Gulf States, London, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 16.
12   Futures, Sovereignty and Policing: An Anthropological View of Gulf Studies, Gulf conference, Exeter, 3 July 2018. 
13   In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town Stanford University Pres, 2010.
14   Masdar City for instance with its potential to provide political legitimacy is an exercise in political anticipation.
15   Khalaf, Sulayman N. “Gulf societies and the image of unlimited goods.” Dialectical Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 1, 1992, pp. 53–84. 
16   Art. 16 “Ownership, capital and labor are the mainstays of the State’s social entity and of national wealth.”
17   Art. 17 “Public property is inviolable and its protection is the duty of every citizen”.
appear in this world of representation: while Limbert 
highlights the threat of the abstract notion of depletion 
hanging over the future of Omanis,13 from which derives 
the imperatives of post-rentierism,14 Kuwait has, as for her, 
been characterised by the “image of unlimited goods” in 
the words of anthropologist Sulayman Khalaf.15
If we take into account both Hanieh’s analysis of oil 
as reverberating unequal social relations at the global 
level and the entry into the capitalist logic as well as the 
anthropologist view on the construction of meaning, the 
presence of oil revenues has come to be interpreted over 
time in Kuwait in a way that reflects a feeling of ownership 
by its citizens/subjects, as a sort of patrimonial asset. 
Kuwait’s legal idiosyncrasies
This feeling has its roots in some historical contingencies 
specific to Kuwait. First the 1962 Constitution enshrines 
several principles pertaining to property and entitlement: 
in part II on the “Basic Foundations of the Kuwaiti Society”, 
articles 16 and 17 mention notions of “ownership”16 and 
“public property”17; article 18 ensures that “private property 
is safeguarded”; article 21 states: “All of the natural wealth 
and resources are the property of the State. The State shall 
preserve and properly exploit those resources, heedful of its 
own security and national economy requisites.” In the part I, 
article six states: “Sovereignty is vested in the Nation as the 
source of all authority”, differentiating also between State 
and ruling family. 
Second, and even before the 1962 Constitution, the land 
acquisition policy of the rulers of Kuwait has also given to 
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the citizens a form of role—if passive—in the management 
of state resources. The government’s plan to transform 
Kuwait city from an old town into a modern city had 
required the purchase of large tracts of land for public 
development projects. To do so, it paid, in a transactional 
manner, phenomenally large prices for land located in 
the old mud-walled center resulting in the constitution of 
private fortunes overnight. According to Khalaf, “It has 
been estimated that between 1957 and 1962 close to US$ 
840 million of public money was spent on land.”18
Thirdly, if we get back to the way oil rent perception has 
shaped people’s behaviours, we will find that the idea of 
the rent as Kuwaiti nationals’ asset, managed by the rulers 
and entitlement linked to a form of autochtony, has had 
concrete economic and socio-political implications as it 
shaped the definition of the size of the citizen body. The 
feeling of entitlement to revenues of oil being linked to 
autochtony or proximity is common wisdom if we just 
think as the way the disgruntling of Shiites of the Eastern 
province is portrayed or the current mobilization of 
Basrawis and inhabitants of the Southern province in Iraq 
who do not benefit from the revenues of the oil pumped 
near their place of abode. My research on statelessness 
has traced the origin of the conception and practice of 
nationality in Kuwait. 
Kuwait has had two laws defining nationality: the first 
was issued in 1948 while the second, still in effect but 
amended several times, dates back to 14 December 1959. 
The existence of the 1948 Nationality Law bears testimony 
to the contingency of the national identity as constructed 
on the basis of the 1959 Law. The main difference between 
the two laws lays in the inclusion of the jus soli in the 1948 
Law, absent in the 1959 law, which would have made the 
Kuwaiti polity look very different from the one we know 
now. As a matter of fact, the 1948 Law identified Kuwaiti 
subjects as ruling family members, those permanently 
18   Ibidem p.65
19    My emphasis. Naturalisation was possible after ten years of residence in Kuwait with employment and proficiency in Arabic, and also by special 
order for those offering valuable services
20   interview, Kuwait, 2007. 
21   ‘Neither autocracy nor democracy but ethnocracy: citizens, expatriates and the socio-political system in Kuwait’, in Paul Dresch and James Piscatori 
(eds), Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, London: I.B.Tauris, 2005,pp. 114 – 35.
residing in Kuwait since 1899, the children of Kuwaiti 
men and the children of Arab or Muslim fathers also 
born in Kuwait.19 At the time, the inclusion of jure soli 
envisioned by the Emir Ahmad al-Jabir and drafted by his 
trusted secretary ‘Izzat Ja‘far, could allow a progressive 
sedentarization of tribespeople and naturalisation of 
Arab foreign expertise, like Ja‘far himself, a Lebanese/
Egyptian national. Eleven years later, the significance of 
Kuwaiti oil exports and the regional context—the rise of 
Arab nationalism and the fall of the Iraqi monarchy—led 
to the dropping of the jus soli in the law, the restriction 
of naturalizations and political rights, so as to keep the 
number of citizens and voters as limited as possible. 
Citizens as shareholders
The assumed link between redistribution and exclusive 
and static vision of citizenry has solidified over time. The 
internalizing of the rent as an asset owned (internalizing 
linked to the pervasiveness of oil as a theoretical metonym) 
is clearly formulated and documented in the later debate 
regarding the possible solutions to the protracted issue 
of statelessness in the country in the 2000s. Those 
opposing naturalization would point at the economic 
cost of integration, known as taklifa/kulfa maliyya or 
iqtisadiyya. Naturalization for those who evaluate its cost 
would constitute a “liability on future generations that 
they cannot morally create.”20 The adverse economic shock 
would require adjustments that, they emphatically fear, 
would jeopardize their own privileges and precipitate the 
end of the subsidized provision of water, electricity, and 
food, a return to market prices, as well as an uncertain 
future for free domestic phone calls, education and 
municipality services (street cleaning or waste collection). 
Longva21 underlines that the hostility towards integration 
of newcomers/foreigners in citizenries is typical of 
any welfare state in the world. Yet, one of the specific 
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characteristics of what Michael Herb calls the “extreme 
rentiers”22 among the GCC rentier systems, as opposed to 
rentiers in general, is the size of their citizenry.  In Kuwait 
citizens feel they have a stake in state assets and expected 
the rulers to manage them the best way possible. 
From very early on, in Kuwait, the oil rent has been 
managed as an asset geared toward investment and 
growth, with the due diligence of “a good householder”. 
This is how the Kuwait Investment Authority, formerly 
Kuwait Investment Board, portrays itself: “The oldest 
sovereign wealth fund in the world” established in 1953, 
eight years before Kuwait’s independence, with the mission 
to “achieve a long term investment return on the financial 
reserves entrusted by the State of Kuwait, providing an 
alternative to oil reserves, which would enable Kuwait’s 
future generations to face the uncertainties ahead with 
greater confidence.”23 The emphasis placed on future 
generations is asserted in 1976 with the creation of the 
Future Generations Fund (FGF), the “intergenerational 
saving platform” created with half of the General Reserve 
Fund with obligation by law for the state to transfer 10% of 
all its revenues and 10% of the GRF net incomes. The fund 
has built itself a reputation as a “responsible and stable 
shareholder and owner.” If partially a retro-narration, the 
idea that there is a responsibility on the part of the rulers 
to manage the rent on behalf of future generations exists 
early on. While the oil metonym persists, the reality is that 
the rent has gradually changed in nature as the revenues 
are drawn as much from the hydrocarbon as from the 
returns on interest: the financial cushion accumulated by 
investment funds amounts to $592 billion nowadays.
Much has been written on the “rentier mentality” that 
emerged from the rent. Some analysis linked specific 
behavioural attributes to the rentier condition. This 
mentality pointed towards the inability to enter productive 
employment and the pursuit of rent-seeking behaviours—
22   Michael Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
23   See KIA official website http://www.kia.gov.kw/en/ABOUTKIA/Pages/MissionVision.aspx
24   “The Rentier state in the Arab world” in The Rentier State ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, IAI, 1990, 49-62. 
25   Ibidem. 
Beblawi using the illustration of the suq al Manakh attitude 
of financial speculation.24 Yet my ethnographic work would 
rather describe this behaviour as capitalist “shareholder/
owner mentality”, that is, a logic according to which assets 
should yield returns. Citizens’ expectations then turn into 
injunctions, which is only possible due to the size of the 
citizenry, the clientelist system, and the very close if not 
parochial monitoring of redistribution between citizens/
client communities. In Kuwait, the limited size of the 
citizenry makes the allocation and advantages conceded to 
some immediately known and envied. 
The shareholder mentality thus has two consequences: 
first, it translates into the idea of getting a fair return on 
one’s share. Famously it is through its role as an owner 
and regulator in the economy that the political elites at 
the summit of the state exert strong informal control and 
thereby create the extensive interpersonal dynamics that 
are so ubiquitous in the political economies of the Gulf 
states. Conversely, groups in Kuwait that see themselves 
as disadvantaged by the rulers’ clientelist practices put 
claims that are in essence relative claims. This is illustrated, 
for instance by the request to bail out citizens’ debts: this 
claim for redistribution by middle-class people is founded 
on the perception that the merchant or economic elite 
part of the society has been unduly advantaged, be it the 
public markets attribution and the handling of public 
tenders made public or even more emblematically, the 
bailing out of banks by the government as was the case 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Second, 
the shareholder mentality creates a pressure for more 
returns. The ruling elite is placed in a position where 
its development and investment policy is expected to 
perform, what Gray25 terms “late rentierism” or the “new 
state capitalism”. This imperative of rent maximising is 
comparable to that of the economic elites themselves 
involved in the global pursuit of returns on investment. 
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Rentier-preneurship:
Dependence and autonomy in women’s entrepreneurship in the Gulf
Crystal A. Ennis, Leiden University
Increasingly rentier states nurture a dysfunctional, but 
useful, relationship with neoliberal capitalism. This 
corresponds with global trends where neoliberal capitalism 
benefits from authoritarian modalities of governance.1 
Oil continues to play an overdetermined role in economic 
governance and economic life in Gulf states. Beyond 
its role in propping up governing establishments, the 
structural logic of the rentier economy runs deep and 
is resistant to change. Yet simultaneously the ideology 
and discourse of the free market, the importance of 
privatization, deregulation, and liberalization of economic 
spaces combined with an emphasis on self-employment 
and individual empowerment has become widespread. 
Like global financial institutions and consultancies, the 
Gulf states too are busy promoting entrepreneurship and 
private sector growth. 
The promotion of women’s entrepreneurship in the 
Gulf region can be understood within this broader 
evolution of rentierism and neoliberal capitalism. 
Women’s empowerment projects around the world, 
whether run by multinational corporations, development 
actors, or the state, claim to empower women through 
market opportunities. Such feminism is critiqued for its 
abandonment of its radical roots and transformation by 
neoliberalism.2 This form of gender empowerment cast 
through the lens of free market rationales is what Kantola 
and Squires have dubbed “market feminism.”3  This global 
development trend melds with economic patterns in 
Gulf economies, cast between oil dependence and policy 
discourse on diversification. 
Looking at the promotion of female entrepreneurship 
allows us to examine how the dual neoliberalization 
of feminism and rentierism interacts with women’s 
economic engagement in the Gulf states. By claiming 
that the experience of female actors in the Gulf is not 
univocal, this essay suggests that state-society relations in 
Gulf economies are more fluid and co-constitutive than 
usually depicted in accounts of rentier states.4 Feminist 
political economy helps to show that understanding the 
reimagination of the rentier state and its impact on society 
requires one to take seriously the deep structures of the 
economy alongside the stories and experiences of so-called 
rentier citizens - at least half of whom are women.
The rentier state meets feminist political economy
Much of the political science scholarship which 
emphasizes the link between rent and authoritarianism 
overlooks the ways in which neoliberalism interacts with 
authoritarianism. The expansion of neoliberal economic 
patterns does not sit well within the theoretical claims 
of rentier state literature, which view autocratic, oil-
economies as power-maximizing, autonomous actors 
with politically-acquiescent populations dependent on 
the state and its various redistributive mechanisms. 
Using entrepreneurship as an entry-point contributes to 
exploring the diverse ways neoliberalism has impacted 
politics in the Gulf.5 
Authoritarian neoliberalism, an analytic lens developed 
by Ian Bruff, helps explain some of these paradoxical 
behaviours.6 It was initially used to explain the rise of 
authoritarian tendencies in democracies, but various 
blends of authoritarianism and neoliberalism can also be 
identified across autocratic countries with recent histories 
of rapid economic development. Some call this ‘state 
capitalism,’7 but I suggest that authoritarian neoliberalism 
better encapsulates the logic and disciplining power of the 
discourse of neoliberalism alongside explicit economic 
policy choices. Indeed, “neoliberalization in authoritarian 
states produces a symbiotic configuration whereby the 
reforms are enacted and protected through existing 
mechanisms of authoritarian statecraft.”8 The promotion 
of women’s entrepreneurship makes the marriage of 
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convenience between rentierism and authoritarian 
neoliberalism especially evident. The utilization of both 
state feminism and market feminism to promote private 
sector growth, diversification, and women’s advancement 
advances narratives of state as reformer and underlines 
how policy agendas can be co-constitutive and mutually 
beneficial.   
A gender-agency problem
Zooming in on women’s entrepreneurship in the Gulf 
allows us to challenge two spaces of analysis common in 
rentier state literature – assumptions about weak popular 
agency in the Gulf ruling bargain and links between oil 
rents and development. 
Gulf women face two marginalizations in economic 
research on the region.  First, citizens in general are 
viewed as voiceless and lacking in agency given the rentier 
ruling bargain. Second, women are viewed as especially 
oppressed either by oil, Islam, or culture – victims of 
policies and norms who need to be saved either by 
benevolent leaders who champion their growth or by the 
market which promises liberation. Occasionally, they are 
instead presented as a sui generis privileged elite whose 
vast financial resources give them endless economic and 
entertainment opportunities.9 But such caricatures are no 
more useful than the more prevalent tropes of oppression.
The literature on rentier political economy therefore tends 
to neglect or to distort the role of women in economic 
change. Policies are not gender neutral, and neither are 
studies. By ignoring women in accounts of economic 
development in the Gulf, we fail to comprehend the 
depth and breadth of economic choices and their impact. 
As Okruhlik has noted, “Not  the simple receipt of oil 
revenue, but the choices made on how to spend it shape 
development.”10 
This essay focuses on one dimension of these economic 
policy changes to highlight the nuances of gender:  why 
have Gulf states chosen to embrace a market discourse 
around entrepreneurship? It appears paradoxical to 
promote independent income generation that may distance 
citizenry from cycles of economic dependence and loyalty. 
The promotion of women’s entrepreneurship is a global 
trend which resonates in distinctive ways through Gulf 
political economy. 
Because women’s participation in labor markets is weak in 
the Middle East, international financial institutions (IFIs) 
view women as an “untapped resource” that can contribute 
to economic growth.11 Gulf states are encouraged to 
motivate women to be entrepreneurial because of the 
potential gains possible from their productive economic 
engagement. The promotion of entrepreneurship 
is being sold globally as a universal remedy to weak 
economic development and labor market outcomes. 
IFIs, multinational corporations, global consultancies 
and governments across political spectrums have lined 
up behind this trend. Even the UN has embedded 
entrepreneurship for development among its Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Furthermore, already 
bloated public sectors have little capacity to absorb more 
citizens. Where the private sector is reluctant to hire Gulf 
nationals, the hope is that employment creation through 
entrepreneurship can be an escape valve.
Injecting Gulf women into entrepreneurship locates their 
productivity in economic accounts. These developments 
are depoliticized and rest upon an intensifying trend of 
technocratizing issues of economic development while 
at the same time failing to problematize the failure of 
economics to value reproduction and ‘women’s work’ in 
economic accounts.12  Moreover, such a discourse proffers 
freedom and autonomy through dependence on capitalist 
markets rather than men.13 
Yet women, just like other social actors, do not experience 
state policies and business relations equivalently. Diverse 
forms of economic participation can be freeing or 
constraining and interact with patriarchal social and 
political forces. My research with female entrepreneurs 
revealed varied experiences with entrepreneurship.14 
Certainly there were those who found it empowering – 
the source of autonomous income leading to financial 
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independence. These women embraced the discourse 
around entrepreneurship and self-employment. 
Others felt that entrepreneurship provided a different 
type of freedom – that is, it allowed them to become 
economically active without necessarily having to be in a 
male-dominated workplace (through, for example, home 
businesses or businesses with primarily female clients). 
Still others experienced it in a reverse way; the financial 
necessity of formal economic participation was a heavy 
burden. Women thus respond to policy discourse spaces 
diversely and find varying ways to use and navigate these 
opportunities to improve their situation. 
Entrepreneurship promotion has melded with women’s 
empowerment projects globally.15 Women joining the 
labor market is viewed as win-win because it is growth 
maximising. Such neoliberal economic policy advice has 
been internalized and promoted from the Gulf state. Like 
corporate women’s empowerment projects “use a version 
of feminism” to earn legitimacy and “develop a reputation 
as good corporate citizens in a globalized economy,”16 
so too do rentier states embrace female empowerment 
through entrepreneurship as one branch of state feminism. 
It supports state narratives of championing women’s roles 
in economics and government. 
Oil rents, women, and the labor market
Scholars have been concerned with whether oil rents 
impede democracy and development in the Middle 
East for several decades.17 Binary answers have shaped 
much of the intellectual engagement around the impact 
of rent on economies, polities, and societies. Similarly, 
when it addresses gender, rentier state literature has 
asked whether rentierism hampers or facilitates women’s 
economic engagement. Women’s economic participation 
is also treated with binary, testable answers. The results of 
economic development choices are determinative of the 
shape and space for female participation. 
The region is widely viewed as underperforming in terms 
of women’s economic engagement. Yet Gulf women have 
excellent access to education, health care, and child and 
elderly care support. Moreover, Gulf women are entering 
universities and completing degrees at higher rates than 
men. They even comprise a higher percentage of computer 
science and IT majors than men.18 The story looks positive. 
However these outcomes are not well reflected in the labor 
market. Gulf women are decidedly underrepresented in 
the private sector workforce.  The World Bank has dubbed 
this phenomenon the ‘gender paradox’ of the Middle East. 
Some scholarship blames oil for these outcomes. Ross 
argues how oil-led development negatively impacts 
women’s labor market participation.19 Oil-dependent 
economies build industrial activities in sectors less 
hospitable to women’s employment globally, like extraction 
and refining.20 Such structural claims have been met with 
vigorous debate.21 Indeed the Gulf region may not in 
fact be the “radical outliers”22 to the impact of economic 
development on women as often predicted for oil 
economies. 
In fact, women in the Gulf are entering the formal labor 
force at higher rates today than previous decades. World 
Bank estimates show that formal female labor force 
participation has at least doubled over the past four 
decades in all six GCC countries (Table 1). While it still 
remains low in Saudi Arabia and Oman, rates in Kuwait 
and Qatar fall within EU averages.23 Theories that view oil 
as relegating women to the home by lifting the financial 
imperative of work have given way to evidence which 
suggests that young Gulf women are more prepared to 
work in advanced industries than men.24
World Bank25
What is evident from this data is that accounts which 
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suggest female labor force participation is low view the 
statistic as a percentage of the total workforce rather 
than as a percentage of the total female population (table 
1).26 It is, however, worth keeping in mind critiques 
of such measures which only consider populations 
of “economically-active” individuals. These data do 
not account for disenfranchised job seekers, the 
underemployed, and those who chose to remain in school 
because of a dearth of economic opportunities. Moreover, 
choosing certain segments of the population to base 
such estimates on, while revealing some trends, muddles 
citizen/non-citizen divides and other often gendered 
phenomenon like household workers and ‘trailing spouses’ 
in expat-dominated economies.  
Data also show a clear preference for public sector 
employment. This is consistent with all Gulf nationals but 
more pronounced among women. As Figure 1 illustrates 
through the Omani case, Omani women comprise 35 
percent of public sector employees, but only three percent 
of private sector ones. 
Part of this can be explained with a view of how economic 
structures shape labor markets in the region. The over-
reliance on oil rents in state budgets has sustained the 
characterization of Gulf states as the quintessential 
rentiers. This is coupled with a dependence on foreign
Figure 1 
NCSI 27
labor that began in the early oil boom years when 
expatriates were required to plug a human resources and 
skills gap. This dependence has continued, constructing 
rigidities in the labor market that are difficult to change.28 
The results are labor markets segmented by nationality, 
skill class, sector, and gender. The predominance of 
non-nationals and men in the private sector obscures the 
visibility of women. 
Furthermore, GCC countries use public sector 
employment as a means of wealth redistribution and 
to manage unemployment. In economies like Bahrain, 
Oman, and Saudi Arabia, hydrocarbon revenues are 
unable to keep up with the expansion of the working age 
population, and unemployment among young people is 
high. Women’s growing entry into the workforce enlarges 
the employment burden on the state – especially where 
women’s employment is preferred in the safe and secure 
public sector.  Thus along with the pursuit of diversification 
and economic growth, the entrepreneurship agenda is 
intended to help offset the state’s employment burden by 
offloading it on the private sector and the individual. 
The state promotion of entrepreneurship can therefore  
be interpreted as reenvisioning ways of spending oil 
income and redistributing wealth to a wider network, 
including women and youth not necessarily from 
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privileged backgrounds. Gulf governments have needed to 
underwrite the provision of new economic possibilities by 
policy strategies like entrepreneurship promotion through 
grants, loans, business incubators, and more.29 Individuals 
compete for access to such state support.  e expansion of 
the rent-seeking net beyond political and commercial elites 
is a noteworthy dynamic.30  
Moreover, a variety of women from diverse social classes 
are embracing the state’s promotion of entrepreneurship 
and self-employment. Few initiatives are innovative with a 
scope that responds to regional economic malaise. Rather 
much of the business activity centers on microenterprises 
and consumption goods. But these entrepreneurial forms 
provide a way of earning independent income. ey also 
illustrate diverse ways women internalize and respond to 
economic options and structures in the economy.
Conclusion
My research on female entrepreneurship promotion 
provides three insights into the transformation of the 
rentier state. First, in trying to stimulate the private sector 
away from oil, the rentier state has found a new way of 
expanding rent circulation. is reform distortion reifies 
the market as the place of liberation and elixir to domestic 
economic woes while at the same time creating a new 
mechanism of reliance on the state. Second, it decouples 
assumed linkages between economic liberation and 
political liberation.  e embrace of neoliberal discourse 
and policy advice is not concerned with improving 
democratic outcomes, but coexists comfortably with 
authoritarianism. ird, while oil does not necessarily 
keep women out of the workforce, the neoliberalization 
of feminism and of rentierism has coalesced around the 
idea that women’s formal labor market participation 
– especially through creating their own enterprises – 
resolves both economic and employment challenges.
is brief claims it is time to untangle gender in political 
economy analyses on the rentier state. It further suggests 
that scholarship on the rentier state should also consider 
the texture of policy impact. Asking qualitative questions 
around how impacts are felt and experienced whether 
deliberately or unintentionally can round out our analysis 
of rentierism and push the boundaries of the questions we 
can continue to ask at various levels of analysis. 
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Social engineering in rentier states
Calvert W. Jones, University of Maryland, College Park
Culture plays a limited role in rentier theory, and social 
engineering even less of one. Two of the best known 
contributors, Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, 
argued in The Rentier State (1987) that such states need 
not bother with national mythmaking since they can 
build loyalty through the distribution of their large stores 
of resource wealth. Why spend time and effort trying to 
shape the culture of a population—constructing stories of 
peoplehood, legitimizing myths, narratives of citizenship, 
and the like—when loyalty can be acquired through easier 
and more direct means? 
The argument is not without its merits. The Gulf 
monarchies, among the richest of rentier states, devoted 
relatively little attention in their early years to devising 
and inculcating elaborate forms of nationalism. Because 
rulers could gain loyalty by providing an unprecedented 
degree of economic and social welfare for citizens, “there 
wasn’t yet a deep coherence or political meaning to being 
Emirati or Saudi or Qatari” (Okruhlik 2011, 126), nor was 
there much urgency to establish one. Dirk Vandewalle 
(1998, 171) draws a similar conclusion in the case of Libya, 
noting that distributive states need not “elicit more than 
perfunctory loyalty” to survive and prosper. Comparisons 
to governments with fewer resources at the time of 
state-formation are especially revealing. Like the nearby 
Gulf states, Iraq was also a monarchy patched over tribal 
allegiances in its early years, yet it could not build loyalty 
in the same way. Shortly after independence, it turned to 
social engineering in the public school system; if it couldn’t 
“buy” loyalty, it would need to instill it by way of a powerful 
nationalist ideology.
It is striking, then, how ambitious and far-reaching social 
engineering efforts by the Gulf rentier monarchies have 
become, both at home and abroad. Not only does rentier 
theory not predict it, but the theory also gives us some 
compelling reasons not to expect it. Of course, such 
social engineering is not an entirely new phenomenon. 
Even though the Gulf monarchies largely eschewed 
the inculcation of all-out nationalism, they dabbled in 
social engineering, especially during the first oil boom, 
by producing museums and histories to legitimize 
ruling families as rightful political leaders. Hence Qatar, 
although “sadly lacking in a civic myth” in the early 1970s, 
soon began “developing symbols that would clarify and 
legitimize [the emir’s] claim to rule” (Crystal 1990, 162). 
Yet such early efforts at social engineering pale in 
comparison to the wider and more penetrating campaigns 
unfolding today. In Saudi Arabia, the new crown prince, 
Mohammed bin Salman, has famously declared his 
country “not normal” (Hincks 2017) and aims to transform 
it with a sweeping set of social and economic reforms, 
reversing the Kingdom’s longstanding preference for 
gradualism. Notably, he is taking on the “third rail” (Gause 
2010) of Saudi politics—gender segregation—by lifting the 
ban on women driving and opening cinemas, including 
gender-mixed ones. Using new public rhetoric and 
symbolism, he is also promoting what he calls “moderate 
Islam,” reducing the power of the Wahhabi establishment, 
and moving toward a more secular nationalism as the basis 
for regime legitimacy. 
In the UAE, the leadership has also sought to defy the 
“king’s dilemma” (Huntington 1968) by fostering a more 
open and globalized society knit together by a new 
nationalism, while maintaining regime legitimacy. As in 
Saudi Arabia, high-profile initiatives promoting knowledge, 
culture, and innovation, such as new universities and 
futuristic cities, are typical (Ulrichsen 2016). But the 
UAE campaign started earlier, and has gone deeper with 
extensive reforms to public education, starting with 
kindergarten. These aim to transform both the mindsets 
and the skillsets of the rising generation in a bid to create 
more “globalization-ready” citizens (Jones 2018). Reforms 
emphasize student-centered methods—pushing creativity, 
problem-solving, and vocational skill over the rote 
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memorization approach of the past—and also a revamped 
nationalism that celebrates UAE identity as pioneering, 
entrepreneurial, tolerant, and loyal. In addition, the regime 
instituted mandatory military service in 2014, with all 
men 30 years or younger required to register and live in 
barracks as they fulfill service requirements (Alterman and 
Balboni 2017).  
Why social engineering? 
Such bold social engineering flies in the face of rentier state 
theory and raises a number of important questions. First, 
why are we seeing such investments in social engineering 
on the part of Gulf rentier states? One answer may be 
cost. Social engineering is not cheap and may produce 
unintended consequences, discussed in more detail below. 
But, as a strategy of building loyal citizens, it is presumably 
cheaper and less distortionary than direct provision of 
government jobs and other forms of state largesse.  
Another important reason is that resource wealth alone 
isn’t enough to secure loyalty and stability and never 
has been. The rentier social contract—in which states 
provide economic and social welfare in exchange for 
citizen loyalty—is more theory than reality. Undoubtedly, 
resource wealth helps. It is telling that the Gulf ’s “extreme” 
rentier states (Herb 2014), such as Qatar and the UAE, 
were among the only regimes in the region to emerge 
from the 2010-2011 pro-democracy uprisings relatively 
unchanged, despite their near absolutism. But such wealth 
is unlikely to serve as a reliable basis for citizen loyalty in 
the longer term. Moreover, as Gulf regimes gear up for a 
confrontation with Iran, widely perceived as an external 
threat, they have further incentive to consolidate strength 
and loyalty. 
The rentier social contract is a variation on what Rogers 
Smith (2003) calls an “economic story of peoplehood,” in 
which rulers gain the support of constituents by making 
socio-economic promises. While there may be some 
leeway—for example, Krane (this volume) shows that 
Gulf governments have removed some subsidies, with 
little of the political consequences expected by rentier 
theory, and Gengler (this volume) suggests that the rentier 
citizen’s freedom from taxation may not be as sacrosanct 
as believed—this type of loyalty is a rickety sort. Without 
a deeper connection to the state, loyalty based primarily 
on economic stories of peoplehood is not likely to persist 
through hard times (Smith 2003), and is instead inclined 
to dissipate when socio-economic promises cannot be 
fulfilled. All the Gulf states are under growing strain 
stemming from a range of factors, including volatility 
in international oil markets, the unequal distribution of 
resource wealth, demand for greater political participation, 
and massive expatriate populations with few rights 
(Davidson 2012). The time will come when shrinking 
resources may constrain the ability to respond through 
distributing more rentier wealth. 
Far from burying their heads in the sand, Gulf leaders 
are increasingly aware of these cracks in the rentier 
social contract, and that brings us to another driver of 
contemporary social engineering—elite agency. Earlier 
theorists attributed considerable autonomy to rentier 
states, seen as divorced from the need to tax and thus 
bargain with their citizens. But these theorists did not 
anticipate the degree to which ruling elites would become 
aware of their own rentier-induced weaknesses and 
seek to address them in innovative ways. In Terry Karl’s 
memorable words, such ruling elites are “weak giants 
that could be rendered ineffective by hundreds of rent-
seeking Lilliputians” (1997, 60). A neglect of elite agency is 
consistent with the oft-noted economic determinism that 
underlies much of the theory. But while rentier economic 
structures can and do influence political actors entangled 
within them, those actors can also make unexpected 
decisions, reflecting at least some degree of freedom to 
think and act within those structures (Hertog 2010).
Social engineering by Gulf rentier states is one area in 
which elite agency plays a key role. Many ruling elites know 
about the perils of resource wealth, not only economically, 
but also politically in the shaky basis for loyalty that an 
over-reliance on it for legitimacy can provide. Some of 
them have even studied the topic in political science 
courses in the West (Jones 2015), and they don’t wish to 
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stand idly by as the challenges deepen. Social engineering 
efforts today are partly a reflection of political elites 
searching for solutions to these challenges, often with the 
support of top international experts (Jones forthcoming 
in 2019). They know that the rentier social contract will 
be difficult to sustain in the coming years, and so they 
are experimenting with ways to adapt it, attempting to 
instill greater economic self-reliance and less expectation 
of government jobs and other forms of state largesse—
without undermining their own legitimacy. 
The new nationalisms underlying these campaigns are 
therefore critical. Rulers need not only prepare their 
citizens economically for a post-petroleum age by 
upgrading skills and mindsets, but they also need to 
reconstruct the basis for legitimacy. In line with this need, 
political symbolism is shifting from rentier themes such 
as “Support us because of the good life we can provide 
you” to neoliberal nationalist messages such as “Work 
hard and contribute to your country because you love and 
owe it,” “Prove yourself by being successful in the nation’s 
private sector,” and “Support us, not because we provide 
for you, but because you are citizens of this great country 
and we are its leaders.” As Ennis (this volume) shows, 
such messages may also be gendered, reflected in Gulf 
government efforts to cast women’s entrepreneurship as a 
means of empowerment.
A third driver of contemporary social engineering is 
a widening recognition that resource wealth, rather 
than being a reason not to bother with mythmaking, 
nationalism, propaganda, and the like, in fact offers 
tremendous opportunities for and temptation to engage in 
such activities. In other words, the earlier rentier theorists 
may have been correct that rentier states do not “need” 
social engineering as urgently as resource-poor states do, 
especially at the time of state-formation. But that doesn’t 
mean they don’t engage in it, for political, economic, 
reputational, and other reasons. The rigid functionalism 
in early rentier theory (“if there’s no need for it, it doesn’t 
happen”) was therefore misplaced. Gulf leaders, far from 
being reluctant social engineers, are coming into their own 
as very enthusiastic shapers of attitude and opinion.
My research has investigated the consequences—intended 
and unintended—of Gulf social engineering. In my book, 
I focus on the UAE drive to build a new kind of citizen, 
better adapted to a more open and globalized world in the 
eyes of the leadership (Jones 2017). Surveying more than 
2000 Emirati youth, comparing incoming and outgoing 
cohorts in regular public schools as well as public schools 
that had implemented major reforms in line with the state’s 
social engineering goals, I found mixed results. 
While the evidence suggested UAE social engineers 
are succeeding in influencing civic attitudes, effectively 
increasing tolerance, civic-mindedness, and patriotism, 
their efforts appear to be backfiring with respect to 
economic and political attitudes. Notably, students 
subjected to social engineering seemed to grow more 
supportive of the citizen’s right to a government job, 
perhaps reflecting a heightened political consciousness 
surrounding ownership of oil rents and the right to one’s 
fair share—a “shareholder mentality” (Beaugrand, this 
volume). They also grew less entrepreneurial and more 
interested in political participation for themselves, albeit 
not other citizens. I described these new citizens as 
“entitled patriots,” highly civic and patriotic yet also highly 
entitled. To summarize, while the data pointed to success 
on the civic front, the evidence did not suggest that UAE 
social engineers are succeeding in their effort to cultivate 
more economically self-reliant citizens without triggering 
political demands. Solutions to the “king’s dilemma” 
remain as elusive as ever.
How and why social engineering efforts succeed or 
backfire—and the normative implications for society—
are likely to remain important questions, especially as 
technologies allow ever-greater means of influence and 
invasion of privacy. For example, in my book, I found 
that the new nationalism being promoted by UAE social 
engineers was itself partly to blame for intensifying 
economic and political entitlement attitudes. By offering 
excessive praise for citizens and their nation, it did not 
motivate hard work and high achievement so much 
as justify elite status. Such “feel-good” nationalism 
was therefore very helpful in promoting civic and 
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patriotic attitudes, but not successful in fostering 
entrepreneurialism, risk-taking, and other development-
friendly attitudes sought by leaders. 
This trend can also be seen in Gulf leaders’ use of social 
engineering abroad (Hertog 2017).  Saudi Arabia has long 
been accused of promoting its own worldview in foreign 
locales, building schools and mosques that legitimize its 
claims to leadership in the Muslim world (Shane 2016). 
But changes in technology and the global media landscape 
have opened up new avenues for such cross-border 
social engineering and invited new entrants to play the 
game. Saudi Arabia and Qatar both have powerful media 
empires today that can be deployed for social engineering. 
Thus, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, Gulf leaders 
used these tools of soft power to complement their hard 
power interventions, furthering their shared interests 
in monarchical regime stability. While rebels in some 
countries, such as Syria, were portrayed in a sympathetic 
light, others closer to home and more threatening to the 
monarchs themselves, such as those in Bahrain, were 
largely ignored (Lynch 2018).
How do international audiences react to Gulf efforts at 
cross-border social engineering? And domestically, is 
social engineering working as Gulf leaders intend? We 
need to ask not only about origins and mechanisms 
of social engineering by rentier states, but also about 
outcomes and limits. While new media technologies have 
empowered social engineering ruling elites, they have also 
empowered citizens to resist efforts to influence them. 
Despite their media empires, the rich Gulf monarchies are 
far from universally loved; thus, while Qatar was popular 
right after the Arab uprisings, that popularity “collapsed 
when [Qatar] was seen to overreach and try to impose the 
Muslim Brotherhood on Egypt” (Lynch 2016, 61). Conflicts 
within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may also limit 
the power of social engineering, as Saudi and Qatari media 
promote increasingly divergent narratives. In addition, 
unintended consequences are typical, a lesson the Saudi 
leadership presumably learned from its earlier, brick-
and-mortar efforts at social engineering in places such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In conclusion, rentier state theory should be extended 
to make more room for culture and social engineering. 
Any of the post-rentier strategies of reform outlined by 
Herb, Diwan, and others in this volume will need to be 
accompanied by newly legitimizing rationales to gain 
popular buy-in. Despite early predictions, rentier states can 
and do engage in ambitious social engineering schemes 
both at home and abroad, and we need to understand 
why, how, and to what effect. Because social engineering 
is booming in the Gulf rentier states, the region offers 
a valuable opportunity to investigate these questions in 
comparative perspective. 
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Borders, sovereignty, and sample selection bias: 
Rethinking the politics of the resource curse
Benjamin Smith, University of Florida and David Waldner, University of Virginia1
Theories of the rentier state and the resource curse are 
amply discussed in the other papers in this collection 
and require no elaborate introduction. Here, we instead 
reconsider one central claim of that literature: that 
conditional on the availability of substantial resource rents, 
autocratic regimes are likely to be unusually long-lived, 
a quality usually described as durability or resilience. We 
echo and extend arguments made by Michael Herb (1999), 
Matthew Groh and Casey Rothschild (2012), and Justin 
Gengler (2015), each of whom finds that the countries 
of the Arabian Peninsula are empirically distinctive in 
ways that confound standard studies of the political and 
economic consequences of oil-based development.  We 
provide a novel account of the distinctiveness of the Arabia 
Peninsula and the challenge the Peninsula’s polities pose 
to standard quantitative analysis. We then re-estimate 
the effects of oil on regime durability to show that the 
conventional wisdom is not robust to model specifications 
that adjust for the distinctives of the Arabian Peninsula.
What make the politics of the peninsula distinctive?  
Many things, identified first by other scholars. Gengler 
(2015, 15) observes that the six GCC states of the Arab 
Gulf are outliers in two dimensions: their near-invariant 
low democracy scores and their fuel rents which, on a 
per capita basis, dwarf the average size of rents in the 
rest of the world. Consequently, looking at a simple 
bivariate, cross-sectional analysis of fuel rents per capita 
and a nation’s Polity IV score, the negative relationship is 
between oil and democracy “is almost entirely dictated by 
the small number of outlying observations consisting of the 
Arab Gulf states along with Brunei and Libya.”  Herb (1999) 
argues persuasively that the monarchies of the Gulf states 
are “dynastic monarchies,” a distinctive type of monarchy 
whose internal structure has proven to be unusually 
1   Authors share equally in all work on this paper. We thank the participants of the Politics of Oil and the Changing Rentier State workshop, George 
Washington University, September 29, 2018. This draft of our memo benefitted especially from comments by Justin Gengler, Michael Herb, Steffan 
Hertog, and Marc Lynch.
resilient. Independent of any effects of oil, then, we have 
solid theoretical reasons to believe that the Gulf states will 
be resilient non-democracies.
Our current research, summarized in this brief paper and 
available in greater detail in other papers, asks a question 
prior to the analysis of Herb, Gengler and others: Why 
do the Arab Gulf states exist as sovereign states given 
the enormous threats to their survival in the early part of 
the twentieth century? After all, small principalities were 
common in pre-modern history but tended to disappear 
in the post-colonial era. Compare a map of the Arabian 
Peninsula to a map of pre-independence India: the former 
contains five principalities – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman – that survived from 
the era of quasi-independence during the long period 
of Pax Britannica, while the latter contains the former 
Princely States – hundreds of them! – that enjoyed British 
protection but simply disappeared at Indian independence.
The phenomenon to which we are drawing attention 
is a type of sample selection bias called survivorship 
bias. Survivorship bias occurs when a social or political 
process causes many units to drop out of the sample, 
while those which survive and enter the sample exhibit 
peculiar features, consistent with their survival, that 
makes them non-representative of the larger population. 
Left uncorrected, survivorship bias can lead to biased 
conclusions. Therefore, standard practice is faulty. 
Standard practice is to estimate a conditional probability 
function, such as the probability of autocratic survival 
conditional on access to resource rents, on all units in a 
cross-sectional and longitudinal data set that spans the 
globe.  Using all of the relevant data would seem to assure 
most scholars that they are not inducing bias through 
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selecting a biased set of cases; but with survivorship bias, 
the bias is built directly into the data set.
The claim that survivorship bias exists such that commonly 
used data sets “over-sample” units that have extremely 
high oil resources and also have inordinately resilient 
monarchies likely to survive even in the absence of oil, 
requires the appropriate causal model.  Figure 1 below 
provides this model and conveys the critical points we wish 
to defend and whose implications we then explore. 
Figure 1 commits us to validating three causal 
relationships, each represented by a solid arrow in Figure 
1. Conditional on establishing these claims, Figure 1 also 
licenses us to make some necessary adjustments to the 
data set in order to reconsider the relationship between oil 
and autocracy. Here, we briefly summarize the set of causal 
claims that are validated in longer versions of this paper.
First, by the very end of the 19th century and the early part 
of the 20th century, British strategic interests in the Gulf 
were undergoing transformation.  While the traditional 
interest in maintaining a secure link to India was never 
displaced, with the onset of the Age of Petroleum, the 
British Admiralty under Winston Churchill – later the 
Colonial Secretary in charge of the Middle East – became 
obsessed with the question of securing access to cheap oil. 
The British met this goal in part by adding new layers to 
existing arrangements with the rulers of Gulf principalities 
– Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the original Trucial States that 
would become the United Arab Emirates, and Oman -- 
between 1913 and the early 1920s. These new agreements 
obligated local rulers to award oil concessions to British 
firms in the event that oil fields were discovered in the 
future.  These new treaty obligations further committed 
Britain to their continued independence, as the newly 
guaranteed monopolistic access to potential oil fields was 
only valuable as long as the signatories continued to rule.
Second, the desire to control potential oil fields led the 
British, beginning in 1920, to defend the five principalities 
from repeated incursions triggered by the dynastic and 
territorial ambitions of Ibn Saud. We feel highly confident 
concluding that were it not for British protection and 
intervention, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would have 
expanded to the shores of the Arabian Gulf: contemporary 
observers, British and Arab, agreed.  While it is possible 
that some of the principalities would have survived as 
city-states, their hinterlands where the oil was to be found 
would be within the borders of a Saudi super-state. 
Third, we argue that British intervention inadvertently 
transformed the five principalities in ways that made them 
inordinately durable monarchies; these transformations 
largely preceded the large-scale exploitation of oil. In 
particular, the dynastic stability that some attribute to 
either the special features of monarchies (Gandhi 2010), 
to the special political culture of Arabian monarchies 
cultivated over the centuries (Menaldo 2016), or to the 
specific dynastic institutions particular to Gulf monarchies 
(Herb 1999), was largely a product of relatively recent 
British intervention. Ironically, dating back to the mid-
1800s, British policy-makers worried that their treaty 
protection of the principalities were engendering moral 
hazard; these worries were prophetic.
Given the reality of endogenous borders, one implication 
is we think incontrovertible: that these five principalities 
would not exist as sovereign nation-states were it not 
for their oil, and that the process of maintaining their 
independence contributed greatly to their autocratic 
resilience.  Global data sets, then, are not a random sample 
of all potential data sets; they are a biased sample that over-
represents small, resource-dependent countries that are 
highly likely to be anomalous autocracies.
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How should we correct this problem? We have no choice 
but to begin the analysis with a standard global data set, 
but we feel justified in making some adjustments to it 
based on the counterfactual we have justified: without 
British intervention, the entirety of the eastern littoral 
would fly the Saudi flag. Using the existing data set, 
we first test a run-of-the-mill hypothesis: following 
the standard story of the political resource curse 
(Ross 2012, Geddes et al 2015) we posit a negative or 
deterrent effect of oil and gas revenues on the probability 
of authoritarian breakdown. The second hypothesis 
embodies our correction to the problem of survivorship 
bias. It constructs a counterfactual historical landscape 
in which all the other Gulf states have been annexed into 
Saudi Arabia, and thus tests whether their existence as 
independent states affects the impact of oil/gas revenues 
on authoritarian breakdown. Here, the oil revenues of 
the “annexed” five countries are incorporated into the oil 
income of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, 
and Oman are dropped from the data set, and all of their 
oil revenues are assigned to the counterfactual super-Saudi 
state.
We test these two hypotheses, one referring to the 
imperfect world we happen to inhabit and one to the 
“corrected world” in which survivorship bias has been 
removed, by estimating first logit and then Cox semi-
parametric hazard models.  Each of these models contains 
the standard suite of control variables.  The results 
are stark: while the rentier state hypothesis performs 
as advertised in the uncorrected data sets, the effect 
disappears in the counterfactually corrected data sets.  
Model coefficients are sharply reduced in size and they 
lose statistical significance. Without the five independent 
principalities, there simply is no rentier effect on autocratic 
stability.  These results are robust to almost two dozen 
different model specifications. 
We conclude with two comments. First, we recognize 
that some of the claims we are making are controversial. 
Much scholarship, beginning with Monroe’s (1981) classic 
2   We thank Steffan Hertog for bringing this point to our attention.
history of Britain’s “moment” in the Middle East, denies 
that Britain was motivated by the need to gain access to 
oil resources. Herb’s (1999, 29-30) exhaustive account of 
dynastic monarchies in the Gulf denies that the British 
played a significant role in the construction of dynastic 
monarchies. We take the claims very seriously, but we 
believe that substantial empirical evidence, far too lengthy 
to summarize here, justifies our claims. 
Second, we are making a relatively narrow empirical claim 
about survivorship bias among the five Gulf principalities. 
We recognize that endogenous borders are quite common; 
we also recognize that borders in the Middle East have 
frequently been contested. Some principalities with oil 
and British sponsorship disappeared, after all.2 Therefore, 
it is crucial to emphasize that our claim of survivorship 
bias rests on the causal model depicted in Figure 1 above.  
Parallel claims about endogenous or contested borders 
must be similarly justified before adjustments such as the 
ones we make here will be methodologically valid.
Still, while methodologically cautious, we encourage others 
to follow the methodological guidelines we propose here. 
We study political and economic outcomes by analyzing 
data, much of which has been generated by those same 
political and economic processes. We need to take the 
idea of a “data generating process” more seriously, taking 
the term literally to mean the creation of data, first and 
foremost by generating units for which attributes can be 
predicates.  We suspect that as this practice becomes more 
widespread, other scholars will give us reasons to rethink 
some other conventional wisdoms.
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Beyond the rentier state: Can regionalism work for Arab states?
Khalid Abu-Ismail, UN-ESCWA Beirut Division Chief
The extensive literature on the political economy in Arab 
states features a distinctively important role for the rentier 
phenomenon (Richards and Waterbury, 1990; Cammet 
et al., 2015; El-Badawi, 2004 and El-Badawi and Makdisi, 
2011 and 2017, El Badawi and Selim, 2016). The rentier 
state hypothesis attributes the region-wide governance 
deficit to a so called ‘authoritarian bargain’ where the state 
(aided by rents from oil-revenues) pledges to low inequality 
and rapid social and economic progress in exchange for 
limitations on political reform and democratic governance 
(Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef, 2009). 
Against this historical and theoretical backdrop, three 
questions are of interest. First, has the rentier state model 
delivered on its end of the social contract? Second, given 
the legacy of the Arab uprisings and the present economic 
and social context, is this bargain sustainable? If not, going 
forward, can regional integration work for Arab States? 
Has the rentier state delivered on its end of the social 
contract?
The development landscape has improved dramatically 
compared to the early 1970s. Progress in health and 
education has been particularly impressive, as can be 
seen in the evidence collected by the global Human 
Development Report of 2010 (UNDP, 2010). Both money-
metric and multidimensional poverty rates (the former 
is often measured by the World Bank’s $1.9 dollar per 
day poverty line and the latter by UNDP and OPHI’s 
Multidimensional Poverty Index) are comparatively 
low in Arab States (UNDP, 2018 and OPHI, 2018). 
Complementing these results, income per capita rates (in 
PPP or constant prices) are on average higher than in other 
developing regions and inequality is relatively low (World 
Bank, 2016). Consistent with the authoritarian bargain 
narrative, socialist and redistributive state-led policies 
dating back to the 1960s and at least up to the early 2000s 
had produced a legacy of low inequality relative to other 
regions such as Latin America, for example (Abdel Gader, 
and El Badawi, 2002).
However, other studies, including the 2012 Arab 
Development Challenges Report, touched upon structural 
challenges that were overlooked by this narrative (UNDP, 
2012). For example, the middle class, which represented 
the dominant economic group in most Arab countries, 
has been under significant pressure since liberalization in 
the early 1990s (ESCWA, 2014a). Poverty, when measured 
appropriately, is much higher than commonly thought. For 
example, according to a 2017 international report adopted 
by Arab countries, two-thirds of the population in the 
ten Arab countries, covering more than two-thirds of the 
population of the region, are either multidimensionally 
poor or vulnerable to poverty (ESCWA, LAS, UNICEF 
and OPHI, 2017). Likewise, a key challenge for the region 
is that the earning of the majority of the middle class in 
many countries are not high enough to protect them from 
poverty. Thus, even a small increase in prices will cause 
them to become poor or vulnerable to extreme poverty. 
Not surprisingly, recent inflationary episodes in many Arab 
countries, especially those in conflict, have significantly 
increased poverty and vulnerability. In effect, this may have 
caused the middle class to shrink to about one-third of the 
population from 2010. 
Broader developmental impacts have been examined 
more thoroughly in the first Arab Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2002). Along with its sequels, it highlighted 
deficits in freedom (or good governance), knowledge, 
and gender equality, particularly in power sharing and 
employment, a peculiarity that is quite perplexing given 
the high diversity among Arab States in income per capita 
and albeit to a lesser extent in human development. Of 
these three deficits, the lag in good governance is arguably 
the most significant and consequential on development 
outcomes. (Abu-Ismail et al. 2016).
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The link between the rentier growth model and its 
socioeconomic consequences is well established. Thus, 
even with a more educated labor force and relatively 
high growth rates from 1990 to 2010, opportunities for 
decent employment fell short. The public sector could 
no longer become the main employer, especially after the 
2000s, as a result of fiscal constraints which also led to 
dwindling public salaries and reduced quality of public 
service delivery in many labor-rich and oil-poor countries 
(ESCWA, 2014). Job creation principally occurred in 
informal low value-added activities, mainly services. 
Consequently, total productivity dropped, real wages froze, 
and vulnerability to poverty increased. Hence, even as 
extreme poverty fell in most countries, the fear of falling 
into poverty rose. In some, notably Egypt, poverty rates 
increased paradoxically alongside handsome economic 
growth during the period from 2000 to 2010. At the same 
time, inequality rose sharply, albeit without being captured 
by official statistics (Sarangi et al., 2015). Alvaredo and 
Picketty (2017) and the World Inequality Report (2018) 
suggest that when taking into account the share of top 
10 per cent receivers of the region’s income, which is not 
captured in household survey data, inequality in the region 
is the highest world-wide.   
In this context, it is not surprising that Arab youth, 
particularly those with higher educational qualifications, 
became disenfranchised and increasingly sought to migrate, 
an option that became more difficult for the vast majority 
as Gulf Cooperation Council countries gradually changed 
their immigration policies in favour of a cheaper workforce 
from Asian countries (ILO, UNDP, 2012). Crony capitalism, 
resulting from the distorted privatization and liberalization 
that mainly benefited the ruling elites, served to exacerbate 
the sense of injustice, especially by middle class youth who 
saw no pathway for economic or social mobility. The end 
result, as seen in the uprisings, was the middle and working 
class’s shift in allegiance, which has tremendously benefited 
violent non-State actors (ESCWA, 2014a). 
Is the rentier bargain sustainable?
Can the rentier state continue to survive under present 
global and regional circumstances? Evidence suggests not 
for much longer. First, the rents themselves are dwindling 
and population size is much larger hence the rent per 
capita is much lower than in the 1970s and 1980s. One 
ramification is that the region’s own consumption is 
projected to rise significantly, leaving less room for exports 
(ESCWA, Arab Vision 2030). Second, even with the recent 
rise in oil prices, long term trends will continue to be 
difficult to predict given uncertainty in global economic 
growth, geopolitical factors, availability of other sources 
(Shale oil) and the challenge posed by green technologies 
(low cost renewables). Third, in light of the above, 
workers remittances, which are still the main source of 
hard currency inflows for oil-poor Arab countries, are 
not expected to rise and may very well decline given the 
increasing pressure on fiscal space in the GCC, especially 
the KSA. Fourth, tourism receipts which are also a 
significant source of foreign exchange receipts have been 
hard hit since the uprisings and a rebound to the 2010 
levels is unlikely in the short- and medium-run. Fourth, 
due to on-going conflicts and other factors, much of the 
physical capital has been destroyed, global and regional 
investment flows dropped sharply, and a significant share 
of the oil revenues are allocated to military expenditure. 
These factors, put together, suggest many countries in 
the region are caught in a vicious cycle of low growth 
with rising poverty, vulnerability, and informality. 
Accentuating this downward spiral is conflict conditions 
and restrictive monetary policy in oil poor countries 
such as Egypt to encourage short-term capital inflows 
and maintain exchange rate stability, the effect of which 
is often overlooked or underestimated by policy makers. 
Consequently, foreign debt and debt service is projected 
to rise in many countries, which will add to the already 
high pressure on fiscal space for current expenditures, 
particularly social protection and public investment 
programs that are essential for the poor. (ESCWA 
rethinking fiscal policies 2017)  
The Arab rentier state, with its current institutional 
capacity and governance framework, is ill-equipped to 
address these multiple challenges. The policy responses 
proposed by the regimes since 2010 have been either 
offering additional rents (oil rich) and/or less space for real 
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voice and accountability and other governance reforms (oil 
poor), essentially an extension of the very same trajectory 
that led to the uprisings. 
What next? 
Arab countries need to think beyond temporary fixes 
and address the root causes of endemic development 
challenges, which are not isolated from one another. 
The two region-wide priorities are ending conflict and 
reversing the trend of growing informalization of the 
labour market due to the concentration of economic 
activities in low value-added sectors. As argued in the Arab 
Vision 2030 Report (ESCWA, 2016), regional integration 
can support the transition from a rentier state to a 
developmental state, providing there is political will at the 
national and regional level to move towards two strategic 
objectives: 
1. Generalized condition of peace and region-wide 
systems of good governance
Attainment of peace and security through a new regional 
integration formula is an integral component of and a 
prerequisite for any future regional integration vision. Only 
then will the region be able to transform itself through a 
new development model. This requires a framework for 
bringing about peace solutions to ongoing conflicts, as 
well as transitional justice frameworks to heal post-conflict 
countries and assist these societies in moving forward. 
Such a new accountability framework should be based on 
the separation of powers, a functioning system of checks 
and balances and the right to information (e.g. open budget 
initiatives or transparent political decision making). In all 
Arab countries, the independence, integrity, and efficiency 
of the judiciary should be safeguarded, not only for the 
sake of a just system, but also as a critical factor for long-
term productive investment. To implement all this, the 
redesign and empowerment of the League of Arab States is 
a must for it to function as a governing body overlooking 
the implementation of regional economic and social 
policies. It is self-evident that a common regional foreign 
policy and a common defence strategy are an integral part 
of this new system.
2. Integrated economies with resource sustainability 
Arab integration into Global Value Chains is an ultimate 
objective of economic integration in order to boost 
commodity exports, create decent jobs, and reduce 
poverty. This would require the establishment of region-
wide infrastructure, energy, and renewable energy 
networks and the development of new routes to enhance 
regional supply chain efficiencies. Any regional integration 
scheme would also need to develop with the aim of 
diversifying patterns of intra-regional trade (in terms 
of commodity and services as well as in the direction of 
trade itself ) and by consolidating economic and trade ties 
with neighbors and further to the east and the African 
continent. This would be aided by establishing an Arab 
Custom Union and reaching a regional agreement on trade 
in services. Eventually, convergence in trade policies and 
concurrently in macroeconomic policies (fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate) can pave way for the preparation of a 
common currency. It would also necessitate a new regional 
financing mechanism such as the new Regional Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development with a large enough 
capital to support regional economic diversification goals 
and regional reconstruction and infrastructure projects.
These actions, the ESCWA projects, would not only result 
in a higher growth rate, but also in better outcomes of 
growth process to workers by generating around 60 million 
jobs by 2030 and guaranteeing their freedom of movement 
between Arab states. In the long term this will induce a 
rise in labour productivity and draw millions of workers 
away from low value-added informal sector activities, 
thus paving a way for their upward social and economic 
mobility. Eventually this employment-led structural 
transformation scenario would translate into lower 
poverty and higher human development outcomes, which 
themselves reinforce better institutions and economic 
growth: the vicious cycle of conflict and de-development is 
at once transformed into a virtuous one (ESCWA, 2016). 
Finally, it would be naïve to think that a shift from the 
rentier state to a developmental state will be easy or that 
a move from nationalism to regionalism would happen 
instantaneously. Structural transformation and integration 
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EXTENSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
require planning, advocacy, and negotiation. It would also 
be naïve to assume these proposals would not be opposed 
by powerful vested interest groups, including the well-
connected ruling elites and their cronies. But as argued 
earlier, the rentier state model has reached its limit and 
extending the business as usual scenario will not resolve 
the region’s long-standing development challenges.  
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